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Abstract 
 
The Egyptian Revolution of 2011 opened up the public space for Egyptian women 
from very different backgrounds. However, although women played a decisive 
role in revolutionary events, this did not result in the abolishment of the 
patriarchal bargain between Egyptian secular-oriented female feminists and the 
state in post-Mubarak Egypt. Even though certain conditions caused the 
suspension of the patriarchal bargain regulating relationships between Egyptian 
secular-oriented female feminists and the state during the Muslim Brotherhood 
regime, these conditions did not indicate the entire cancellation of the bargain. 
The patriarchal bargain between Egyptian secular feminists and the political 
leadership has been reestablished during the presidential rule of El-Sisi. This 
study aims at explaining how and why Egyptian secular-oriented feminist 
women’s coping mechanisms and the strategies in dealing with successive 
political leaderships, the Muslim Brotherhood regime in power from 2012-2013 
and the El-Sisi regime during the presidential term between June 2014 June and 
June 2015 differed from each other. Based on my interviews which were 
conducted with the activists, domestic and international legal instruments, 
secondary sources including UN human rights reports and NGO reports, as well 
as scholarly articles and media reports, I found out that the majority of secular 
women activists’ strict ideological differentiation with the Muslim Brotherhood 
regime emanating from gender-discriminatory policies of the Brotherhood led 
them to suspend the patriarchal bargain with the state. Furthermore, I also 
demonstrated that activist women’s disdain of the Brotherhood along with their 
support for new progressive laws on the protection of women's rights in the 
Egyptian’s Constitution of 2014 have made them support El-Sisi’s military rule 
with some reservations even though the recent regulations of El-Sisi’s leadership 
have allowed the state to restrict NGOs’ activities and freedom of association. 
 
Keywords: Patriarchal bargain, Egyptian secular feminism, the Egyptian 
Revolution of 2011, post-Mubarak Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, El-Sisi 
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1 Introduction 
 
The Egyptian Revolution of 2011 opened up the public space for Egyptian women 
from very different backgrounds. Women played an important role during the 
protests and revolts that led to the overthrow of the 30-year Mubarak regime and 
the demolition of its ruling apparatus. According to eyewitness testimonies, 
women constituted 20 to 50 percent of the protesters in Tahrir Square and its 
vicinity (Hafez 2012: 38). Gender was not a motivation affecting the participation 
to the protests and demonstrations. “The revolution was planned, executed, and 
supported by both men and women” (Sholkamy 2012: 153). Moreover, regardless 
of age or status, rural or urban, rich or poor, veiled or unveiled, women took to the 
streets and articulated their demands for change. 
 While in the past, feminism and the struggle for women’s rights were 
substantially made by upper middle class and highly educated people, today 
feminist activism creates new perspectives of gender and class relations by 
attempting to redesign the political sphere (Sorbera 2014). As well, a lot of 
feminist initiatives and organizations were formed that have been working for 
various issues such as violence against women, sexual harassment and political 
participation.
1
 Change is already happening. With the words of  Hala Shukrallah, 
who was elected in 2014 as the first Egyptian women to head a major Egyptian 
political party (Al-Dostour/Constitution Party) and also first Coptic Christian 
(cited in Kingsley 2014): “What we’re seeing here is that something truly on-the-
ground is happening”. 
 However, although women played a decisive role in revolutionary events, 
this did not result in the abolishment of the patriarchal bargain between Egyptian 
women and the political leadership. This is particularly relevant for Egyptian 
secular-oriented feminist women. Certain conditions caused the suspension of the 
patriarchal bargain regulating relationships between Egyptian secular feminists 
and the political leadership, but did not lead to the entire cancelation of it. 
                                                 
1
    In regard to different feminist initiatives that were formed after the revolution, these are some 
examples: ‘Ganobia Horra’, ‘Ashtar’, ‘That’. Also, there are other groups that formed 
responding to rampant mob-sexual assaults and gang rapes in Tahrir Square and its vicinity. 
These include: Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault (OpAntiSH), Tahrir 
Bodyguard, and Basma (Imprint Movement). 
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Throughout the brief parliamentary experience of the Freedom and Justice Party 
(the FJP, hereinafter), political branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (the MB, 
hereinafter), and the presidency of Mohamed Morsi, Egyptian secular feminists 
did not regard patriarchal bargaining with the political authority as a useful tool to 
maximize their power and opportunities (Al-Ali 2013, Hatem 2013). I call this the 
suspension of the patriarchal bargain. Nevertheless, the patriarchal bargain 
between Egyptian secular feminists and the political leadership was reestablished 
during the presidential rule of El-Sisi who previously led a coalition to remove 
President Mohamed Morsi from power and suspended the Egyptian Constitution 
of 2012 as well as to outlaw the MB (Pratt 2015).  
 Despite detecting the reemergence of the patriarchal bargain with the state 
during El-Sisi’s presidency, previous studies predominantly focus on authoritarian 
and undemocratic character of the political transition led by the Egyptian military 
and cannot seem to make sense of the reestablishment of the bargain given the 
state cooptation and top-down impositions from El-Sisi’s rule (Al-Ali 2013, 
Magdy 2013, Pratt 2015). On the other hand, when it comes to the suspension of 
the patriarchal bargaining with the political leadership taking place during the 
MB-dominated government term, analysts in general tend to agree with the 
decision of secular feminist women not to bargain with the Brotherhood regime 
given the undemocratic and exclusive politics of the Brotherhood (Al-Ali 2013, 
Hatem 2013, Hafez 2012). Studying the factors behind the different strategies 
followed by secular Egyptian feminists in two successive periods, during the 
period of the MB regime (2012-2013) and during El-Sisi’s presidential term 
between June 2014 and June 2015 respectively, can contribute to knowledge on 
the motivations behind the changes in women’s strategies in dealing with the 
state. This can also pave the way for a more comprehensive picture of the 
connection between leaderships’ policies and women’s strategies and motivations. 
In this thesis, I will attempt to fill this gap by not only examining how secular-
oriented feminists’ strategies changed but also by pursuing explanations on the 
reasons of these changes.   
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1.1 Purpose and Research Question 
 The aim of this thesis is to analyze how and why Egyptian secular-oriented 
female feminists’ coping mechanisms and strategies with the successive political 
leaderships were differently shaped after the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. In this 
study, primarily, postcolonial feminist theoretical framework and semi-structured 
interviewing method are used to generate the aim. However, the rapidly changing 
landscape during subsequent weeks in Egypt led me to confine my analysis to a 
certain period of time while analyzing women’s patriarchal bargaining with the 
El-Sisi’s leadership. Therefore, my investigation on El-Sisi’s presidential term 
will be confined to dates between June 2014 and June 2015. The reason why I 
chose this period to analyze emanates from the fact that I conducted my last 
interview in June 2015. In order to achieve the aim of this study, the following 
research question was designed: 
 
• Why and how did secular-oriented Egyptian female feminists’ coping 
mechanisms and strategies with the state during the political leadership of the 
Muslim Brotherhood (2012-2013) and the political leadership of El-Sisi 
between June 2014 and June 2015 differ from each other? 
 
1.2 Conceptual Considerations   
In line with the postcolonial feminist approach that I employ throughout my 
research, this thesis puts specific emphasis on the stories of the subjects that I am 
‘translating’ into the language of academic research. Therefore, I usually adhere to 
concepts and words that my interviewees use when expressing their own feelings 
and thoughts about our conversation. 
 
Feminist or Women’s Rights Activist? 
The women I interviewed generally do not differentiate the ‘women’s rights 
movement’ from the ‘feminist movement’. In contrast to earlier narratives of 
members of the Egyptians women's rights movement that I came across 
throughout my literature review (please see: Al-Ali 2000, Hafez 2011), 
interviewed activists did not reject the label ‘feminist’. Despite the fact that the 
English term ‘feminist’ has negative image in the Egyptian society due to its 
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assumed ‘westernized’ implication, a great number of activists do not refrain from 
using the term when talking with me as a researcher who does not need to be 
convinced about the legitimacy of struggle for women’s rights. 
 However, that is not to say that activists insist on their use of term 
‘feminism’ when creating the dialogue with the state bureaucracy and grassroots. 
The major reason behind the reluctance of activists to identify themselves with 
feminism lies in the public opinion that the use of the term feminism glosses over 
the larger problems such as imperialism, economic injustice and Zionism. 
However, as mentioned above, I detected that once they have the opportunity to 
talk with someone who has a similar ideological and political orientation 
regarding women’s rights, they preferred the use of ‘feminism’ without any doubt. 
That is why I do not imply any different connotations when using ‘feminist’, 
‘women’s rights activist’, ‘feminist activism’ or ‘women's rights activism’. 
However, for the sake of avoiding repetition, I sometimes use ‘feminist’ and 
‘feminist activism’, and other times ‘women's rights activist/activism’. 
 
Organization, Movement and Activism 
In this thesis, regardless of the formal or informal character that they have, I use 
‘organization’, ‘movement’ and ‘group’ synonymously. Concerning the use of 
‘activism’, I allude to a broad range of involvements and activities that can be 
performed at any given point of time such as active participation to gatherings, 
research, lobbying and advocacy. Therefore when I refer to ‘activist’, I address the 
people involved in women’s rights issues. In this sense, I avoided standardizing 
and over-generalizing various political or ideological engagements and priorities 
of feminist movements.
2
 
 
Being ‘secular’ 
I believe that it is better to use preliminary framework while appealing to the 
                                                 
2
 There are different goals and priorities of Egyptian feminist organizations that are translated into       
    various projects and activities including legal assistance programs; legal awareness workshops    
    and publications; campaigns to change existing laws (particularly the Personal Status Law and  
    the Law of Association); the establishment of a Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) Task Force;  
    setting up a network to research and campaign around the issue of violence against women;  
    organizing seminars; workshops and conferences to address and raise awareness about certain  
    issues. 
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notion of the ‘secular’. My use of the ‘secular’ thus addresses the acceptance of 
separating religion from politics without essentially being anti-religious or anti-
Islamic. The main source of legislation that women’s rights activists appeal is also 
my point of departure in differentiating secular feminism from other women’s 
rights activists. In this thesis, I classify women’s rights activists on the basis of 
their endorsement of civil law or Islamic law (shari'a). I suggest that – regardless 
of their personal religious observance – secular feminists approve civil law and 
resolutions of human rights conventions such as the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (the CEDAW) and 
UN-Stipulated World Conferences on women as frames of reference for their 
struggle.    
 
Why Secular Feminism?  
As it is stated in the beginning, this study aims at examining female secular 
feminists’ motivations that led to the suspension and then the reestablishment of 
the patriarchal bargain with the state. In this regard, this work intends to shed light 
on secular feminist activism in Egypt in post-Mubarak Egypt. However, this is not 
to suggest that all feminists in Egypt have to be secular. Nor it is my intention to 
indicate that Islamists can by no means feminists. Apart from my early experience 
in the field of Middle Eastern Studies that led me to engage in secular feminism, 
throughout my research, I have come to realize that secular feminist activism in 
Egypt tend to be homogenized and labeled as anti-Islamic (see, for example: Daly 
2010). I also detected that much of the recent feminist scholarship studying Egypt 
overlook secular constituencies while drawing particular attention to Islamist 
tendencies and activism (see, for example: Hafez 2011). Furthermore, while some 
academics tend to see Islamic feminism as the next stage of secular feminist 
activism (Dally 2010, Badran 2005, El-Safty 2004, Posusney et. al. 2003), some 
even claim that the majority of Egyptian feminist activists refer to Islamic laws as 
the frame of reference for their activism (see, for example: Younnis 2006). 
 On the contrary however, my interview experience with members of 
different women’s rights organizations and independent feminists, I came across 
different meanings being ascribed to the notion of ‘secular’. As I will show in the 
following chapters, and particularly in chapter entitled ‘Analysis’, it is also my 
argument that the implication of secular feminism in Egypt is not discriminatory 
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against religious people and discourses. Rather it inclusive of all Egyptians by 
having space for and respecting religious difference without emphasizing any 
particular religion. 
 
The Muslim Brotherhood, The Freedom and Justice Party and Morsi’s 
Presidency  
Even though the FJP is an Egyptian political party whereas the MB is a 
transnational Sunni Islamist organization known for its “political activism and 
Islamic charity work” (Ghattas 2001), I used sometimes the FJP and the MB 
synonymously. It thus should be underscored that while using ‘the Muslim 
Brotherhood’ and ‘the Muslim Brotherhood’s regime/rule’, I generally refer to the 
FJP. The fact that the MB has strong links to the nominally independent FJP led 
me to use the names of those two allegedly different organizations 
correspondingly. In addition to this, despite the presidential term of Mohamad 
Morsi (30 June 2012 to 3 July 2013) not corresponding completely with the 
executive term of the MB-dominated parliament (lower house which began 
execution of its functions in early 2012, but was dissolved by the constitutional 
court in June 2012), phrases such as ‘Morsi’s regime’ and ‘the MB regime’ were 
used synonymously given that Morsi was nominated as the MB’s presidential 
candidate (see also: BBC).
3
 
 
1.3 Essential Theoretical Concepts 
In this section, definitions of essential theoretical concepts are provided in order 
to clarify the language used throughout the study.  
 
Patriarchal Bargain  
Kandiyoti (1988) argues that under some circumstances, women historically and 
strategically agree to negotiate with patriarchal politics and different forms of 
patriarchy of any given society. These negotiations can get different extents based 
on class, caste or ethnicity (Ibid.). Kandiyoti (1988: 285) describes this strategic 
                                                 
3
    However, the executive term of Shura Council (upper house which began functioning in 
February 2012 and, and which was dissolved by the constitutional court in 5 July 2013) 
corresponded to presidential term of Morsi. 
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position as ‘patriarchal bargain’ to explain mechanisms consisting of a set of 
constraints in which women choose to endorse patriarchal norms and 
acknowledge gender roles in order to “maximize security and optimize life 
options with varying potential for active or passive resistance in the face of 
oppression” (1988: 274). According to Kandiyoti (1988: 285), “Patriarchal 
bargains do not merely inform women’s rational choices but also shape the more 
unconscious aspects of their gendered subjectivity, since they permeate the 
context of their early socialization, as well as their adult cultural milieu”. 
 However, while Kandiyoti (Ibid.) regards patriarchal bargain as a 
negotiation with patriarchy to explain the relationship between the genders; 
having inspired by Sharine Hafez (2014), I use the term ‘patriarchal bargain’ here 
to mainly address the patriarchal bargain between Egyptian women and the 
country’s political leaders.  
 
Political Leadership  
The concept of ‘political leadership’ is challenging to define, “because it is 
dependent on institutional, cultural and historical contexts and situations – both 
particular and general” (Masciulli et al. 2009: 4). However, political leadership 
includes such elements as the nature of the “leaders’  interpretative judgements” 
(Ibid.: 5), and the organizational context in which the leader being either as the 
legislative branch or the presidential authority in determining state-society 
relations. According to Masciulli et. al. (2009: 6), “ ‘Political leadership’ overlaps 
significantly with the higher levels of military, legal, organizational, and religious 
and ideological leadership, and is a special part of ‘social leadership’ in general”. 
This is particularly relevant to the Egyptian context. In the Egyptian case, I thus 
use the concept of political leadership to point out the country’s most powerful 
political authority, which sometimes implies the MB (to put it differently, the MB 
regime), and sometimes indicates military rule under the leadership of El-Sisi (in 
other saying, El-Sisi’s regime) according to the context. In this regard, the state is 
generally used correspondingly with the political leadership. The notion of 
‘political authority’ is also used synonymously with the political leadership.  
 
Sexual Violence/Gender-Based Violence  
Sexual violence contains sexual abuse and sexual exploitation. It indicates any 
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attempt or threat of a sexual nature that (is likely) to lead to emotional, 
physiological and physical harm. Article 2 of the Declaration on the Elimination 
of Violence Against Women (UN 1993) provides that, “Violence against women 
shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, the following: 
 
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, 
including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, 
dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and 
other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence 
and violence related to exploitation; 
(b) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the 
general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment 
and intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, 
trafficking in women and forced prostitution; 
(c) Physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned 
by the State, wherever it occurs.” 
 
Gender  
According to the UNDP Gender Equality Strategy 2014-2017 (UNDP 2014) 
‘gender’ refers to: 
   
the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and 
female and the relationships between women and men and girls and 
boys, as well as the relations between women and those between men. 
These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially 
constructed and are learned through socialization processes. They are 
context/ time-specific and changeable. Gender determines what is 
expected, allowed and valued in woman or a man in a given context. 
 
1.4 Disposition 
This thesis is structured into six chapters. Following this introductory chapter, a 
historical background of the patriarchal bargain between Egyptian feminists and 
the state is given to understand the context in which the suspension and then the 
reemergence of the bargain took place respectively after the Egyptian Revolution 
of 2011. In the subsequent chapter, the theoretical framework is explained. In the 
fourth chapter, the methodology of the thesis is presented, including sections on 
case study method; interviews; and domestic and international legal instruments, 
 
 15 
secondary sources such as NGO and UN human rights reports, scholarly articles 
and media reports. Through analysis of the collected data, chapter five provides an 
analysis of women’s motivations and other factors that can reveal the suspension 
and then the reemergence of the patriarchal bargain. In the last chapter, discussion 
of the findings and the conclusion will be provided.  
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2 Background: Historical Patriarchal Bargaining with the 
State 
 
In this chapter, I will give a brief account of the historical patriarchal bargain 
between Egyptian feminism and the state. While doing so, relevant accounts in the 
existing literature will be discussed. In addition to this, I sometimes appeal to 
feminist activists’ own interpretations and understandings regarding the history of  
the feminist movement. In this regard, four successive periods will be analyzed: 
Beginnings (1919-1952), Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Leadership (1952-1970), Anwar 
Sadat Period (1970-1981) and the Hosni Mubarak Era (1981-2011). The chapter 
ends with the brief conclusion on the historical patriarchal bargain between the 
Egyptian feminism and the political leadership.  
 
2.1 Beginnings (1919-1952) 
Feminism in Egypt is almost a century old. Many scholars begin their analysis on 
Egyptian women’s rights movement with women’s active participation in the 
1919 nationalist revolution against the British colonial
4
 rule and the following 
growth of feminist activism with Huda Sha’rawi and Egyptian Feminist Union5  
(Ahmed 1982, Hatem 1986, Philipp 1978). Many studies analyzing Egyptian 
women’s movement ascribe the intellectual legacy of early fights for women’s 
emancipation to male reformers such names as Muhammad Abduh, Gamal Al-
Din, Al-Afgani and Quasim Amin (Ahmed 1982, Al-Sabaki 1987, Hatem 1986; 
cited in Al-Ali 2000: 56). More recent literature, however, argues that women’s 
involvement into the 1919 revolution should rather be seen as the perpetuation of 
decades-long women’s rights struggle (Ahmed 1992, Badran 1995). However, 
regardless of the debate over the ‘gender origins’ of the Egyptian feminist 
                                                 
4
    The British Occupation in Egypt lasted from 1882 until 1956. Even though the 1919 revolution 
caused the British acknowledgment of Egyptian independence, the Britain did not pull out its 
force from the Suez Canal Zone. In 1956, the Occupation officially ended by the withdrawal of 
British forces in accordance with the Anglo-Egyptian  agreement in 1954. 
5
   Huda Sha’rawi established the The Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU) in 1923. The Union was 
more into the struggle of political rights for women. Among their demands fulfilled by the 
government are compulsory educations for girls in 1925, and women’s admission to the 
national university in 1933. EFU’s activism was determined by both  theinterplay and tension 
between feminism and nationalism (Badran 1995: 94-98). According to Badran (1995: 96), 
founding members of the union were coming from wealthy families. 
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movement, the emergent feminism in the (post)colonial Egypt associated itself 
with secular nationalist discourse for a long time (Al-Ali 2000: 56-7). 
 Rather than exploring the question whether roots of the historical women’s 
movement should be traced back to male or female reformers, various scholars 
draw attention to ‘gendered discourses’ produced by male reformers which were 
disguised behind the nationalist patriarchal discourse. This is why Baron (1994: 4) 
objects to “pattern of stressing male thinkers at the expense of female ones”. Leila 
Ahmed (1992) also strongly argues that historical origins of Egyptian feminism 
cannot be subsumed under the works of aforementioned male intellectuals mainly 
due to their patriarchal engagements. Ahmed (1992: 162-3), shows that in the 
context of Amin’s works that overwhelming majority of male reformers “merely 
called for the substitution of Islamic-style male dominance by Western-style 
dominance”. 
 Philipp (1978) demonstrates that it is not that likely to connect the feminist 
struggle to the nationalist movement in a positive way. Even though prior to 1919, 
the period when the nationalist struggle had yet to be achieved, nationalists 
approved the nationalist struggle of women (boycotts, demonstrations etc.) against 
British colonial rule, “after 1919, when nationalists pressures emerged in the wake 
of promulgation of a constitution for Egypt, women’s political rights were not 
mentioned. Their equality with men was not discussed” (Ibid. 278). 
 While some earlier academics concluded that “'feminism formed part of 
the content of nationalist thought (Hourani 1962: 215; cited in Philipp 1978: 
277)'”, it soon became “'clear to many feminists that during the nationalist 
struggle, and certainly afterwards, [that] men’s nationalism had a patriarchal 
character' (Badran 1988: 31)” (cited in Al-Ali 2000: 61). In this regard, the 
portrayal of the feminist activism during post-independence period demonstrates 
that the idea of emancipation of women was upheld by postcolonial state policies 
as long as it served the interests of the anti-colonialist struggle which was in 
harmony with the official state policies.  
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2.2 Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Leadership (1952-1970) 
Various scholars underline that Nasser's regime inaugurated a new period for 
women by altering the class structure and through the ideological and legal 
inclusion of women in the new state (Al-Ali 2000, Ahmad 1992, Hatem 1994, 
Hatem 1992). The 1956 Constitution declared that all Egyptians are equal 
irrespective of gender. Labor laws were also amended to guarantee state sector 
jobs for “all holders of high school diplomas and college degrees irrespective of 
gender” (Hatem 1992: 232). After women received suffrage and the right to run 
for government offices by the 1956 Constitution, as Al-Ali (2000: 68) points out, 
“the education system was reformed to increase enrollment, both for primary and 
secondary education, which particularly affected female participation in higher 
education”. 
 It is interesting to see that many feminists who were young during the 
Nasser period identify Nasser’s regime with progress, secularism, development 
without foreign aid (Al-Ali 2000: 68). When it comes to Nasser’s struggle with 
Islamic constituencies and organizations that were excluded by the regime, these 
women usually appreciate regime’s efforts. Al-Ali (2000: 68) cites Summaya M., 
a secular feminist who is in her 60s, in order to reveal shared thoughts on Nasser's 
policies towards the MB among these activists: 
 
I believe that nobody fought the Muslim Brotherhood as he [Nasser] 
did and nobody knew how to defeat them. He met their logic with the 
secular logic independently, as opposed to Sadat and Mubarak.   
 
 However, dramatic achievements of the Egyptian state, in education, social 
mobility and employment, referring the progressive feature of Nasser’s regime 
were paralleled by the preservation of the conservation Personal Status Law (PSL, 
hereinafter) of the 1920s and 1930s.
6
 Women’s achievements with regard to 
economic and political rights were thus accompanied by the gendered and 
discriminatory legal provision within PSL (Elsadda 2011: 86-8). The existence of 
PSL serving to regulate women’s position as submissive to male authority in the 
private sphere in this regard caused a bizarre dichotomy. Hatem (1992: 232) thus 
                                                 
6
    Law regulating divorce, marriage, child custody etc.  
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convincingly argues that 
  
state feminism
7
  under the Nasser regime produced women who were 
economically independent of their families, but dependent on the state 
for employment, important social services like education, health and 
day care, and political representation. While state feminism created 
and organized a system of public patriarchy, it did not challenge the 
personal and familial views of women's dependency on men that were 
institutionalized by the personal status law and the political system. 
 
 Even though the gender gap diminished during Nasser’s political 
leadership, the regime’s pledge to women’s rights issues as part of its wider 
agenda for social justice appeared to be juxtaposed to the abolition of feminist 
organizations functioning independently from the state. 
 Moreover despite social welfare was available to all, patriarchal gender 
ideology that prevented women from involving in economy and politics remained 
largely unchanged. “What was worse, the Islamic personal status law still 
controlled domestic matters and were not changed by the new ruling regime” 
(Hafez 2011: 69). Although certain endeavors to set up a state-sponsored 
feminism which attempted to incorporate women into certain ‘ability zones’ that 
males were already enjoying, women’s political roles remained unchallenged 
during this period. 
  
2.3 Anwar Sadat Period (1970-1981) 
After becoming president, Anwar Sadat (1919-1981) put into action his new 
agenda. Throughout his presidency, the role that the state played as an economic 
and social agent of change was reduced. Not only were many of – albeit 
contentious – gender equality programs canceled which were active during 
Nasser’s regime, but also intifah (open door) policies committed to international 
corporations, foreign investment and economic policy of the privatization – to put 
                                                 
7
   I find Zheng’s (2005) definition of ‘state feminism’ most relevant to the Egyptian context. 
According to Zheng, (2005: 519) ‘state feminism’ can be conceptualized “to enable scholarly 
examinations of the institutionalization of feminism in state agencies in a variety of political 
and economic systems”. Without any doubt, state feminism as top-town approach to women’s 
rights issues reveals a set of constraints in which women try to maximize their life options. In 
this sense, state feminism can be seen as an excellent example of the patriarchal bargain 
between the leadership and Egyptian women. 
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it differently, new capitalist orientation of the regime –  widened the gap between 
poor and rich (Al-Ali 2002).  The majority of Egyptians experienced negative 
outcomes such as “high inflation; serious shortages; particularly in housing; low 
wages; reduced employment prospects and poor working conditions” due to the 
state’s departure from the policies of social equality and equal opportunity 
(Ahmed 1992: 219). 
 There were divergent outcomes of Sadat's infitah on women. One of them 
is directly pertinent with certain class positions that women occupied. As Al-Ali 
(2000: 73) clarifies, “Upper-middle-class and upper-class women certainly 
benefited more from Sadat's infitah than lower-middle-class and working-class 
women”. While Sadat economic policies led some few privileged women to 
rampant consumerism and extravagant wealth, the status of rest of them 
deteriorated due to infitah’s broader effects. Their integration into the economy as 
a part of Nasser’s ‘state feminism’ was dismantled by high inflation, chronic 
shortages of basic goods and reduced employment opportunities. 
 According to the literature (El-Guindy 1981, Hafez 2011, Hatem 1992), 
polarization of social inequality as a result of intifah also allowed Islamism to rise 
by the 1970s. Sadat’s initial cooperation with Islamists organizations being 
marked by the early 1970s aimed at achieving greater legitimacy in the public eye 
by using religious jargon. Sadat also needed the support of his new companions to 
take positions against leftist and Nasserists who were constantly charging the 
Sadat administration of withdrawing from social equality oriented policies that 
were followed during Nasser's regime (Ahmed 1992). Sadat for instance explicitly 
heartened the MB to continue their activities which Nasser had banned (Hafez 
2011, Ahmed 1992). By permitting the MB to the publication, Sadat helped them 
to reach a wide audience. It also helped the dissemination of religious idioms as 
the mainstream jargon within the Egyptian political discourse. Ahmed (1992: 217) 
says in this regard: 
 
Furthermore, as their publications turned to criticizing not only 
Nasserism and communism but also Sadat's policies, particularly after 
the treaty with Israel, their religious idiom also became the language 
of dissent and discontent. With other discourses of opposition silenced 
leftist publications had been banned – the Islamic idiom became the 
only vehicle of dissent. Once allowed to gain popularity and 
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legitimacy, the Islamist position was difficult to limit: (…) once the 
Islamists had gained ground, he could afford to lay himself open to the 
charge of being anti-Islamic. 
 
 The state during Sadat’s regime did not have a clear agenda to address 
women’s rights and did not support independent feminist activism. Paradoxically 
however, “it was under Sadat that PSL was reformed in favor of women's rights” 
(Al-Ali 2000: 73). The Personal Status Law (PSL) was issued during the Sadat’s 
presidential term. The law gave women the right to divorce, right to travel 
regardless of her husband’s permission. Also, the legal age of marriage was raised 
from 16 to 18 among other stipulations. In the following year, Egypt ratified the 
UN Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discriminations against 
Women, albeit with reservations.
8
 
 Some argue that the start of United Nations Decade for Women in 1975 
triggered the Sadat administration to advance women’s rights to promote its image 
internationally (see, for example: Al-Ali 2000: 71-4). In the attempt to seek robust 
economic and political support from its new allies, particularly from the US, the 
state anticipated that advancing gender issues could be also useful to encourage 
the secular alliance among men and women. In this instance, Sadat hoped to 
weaken the role that Islamists played in politics and to differentiate the state’s 
political agenda from that of Islamists (interestingly, echoes of both earlier 
coalition formed with Islamists).   
 To conclude, during Sadat’s period, much like under Nasser, women were 
destitute of independent organizations and were reliant on the regime’s specific 
needs. Despite the progressive laws of 1979
9
 which granted women legal rights in 
marriage, polygamy, divorce and child custody, and the CEDAW ratified in 1980, 
the state lacked a clear agenda to address women’s rights and discouraged 
independent feminist activism. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
    For comprehensive analysis of reservations to the CEDAW, please see: Freeman, 2009. 
9
    According to Al-Ali (2000: 74), The Personal Status Law of 1979, “granted women legal rights 
in marriage, polygamy, divorce and child custody; it was implemented by presidential decree 
along with another law that introduces changes to women’s representation in parliament. ” 
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2.4 Post-infitah Feminist Activism and the Bargaining with the 
New Leadership: Years with Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011) 
The early years of Mubarak’s presidential term were marked by the conflict with 
the Islamist groups over the implementation of shari'a
10
. The increasing power of 
Islamic organizations which gradually gained grassroots legitimacy in the eyes of 
conservative constituency pushed the Mubarak regime to legislate and implement 
conservative laws towards women’s rights issues. On the other hand, in parallel 
with the Islamic pressure that Mubarak faced, the Egyptian economy increased its 
dependence on the United States and international organizations such as the World 
Bank and the IMF. Western pressure for the political restoration of Egypt 
compelled Mubarak regime to promote democracy in compliance with the 
‘western’ set of values like human rights and UN conventions on women’s rights 
(Botman 1992). Uncertainty and struggle with conflicting forces thus constituted 
the regime’s primary preoccupation from the very beginning until its last years. 
 In the search for reconciliation with Islamists, The Personal Status Law 
was revised in 1985 in that it was regarded anti-Islamic by conservative groups. 
As a result of amendments, various rights that women acquired from its earlier 
version were canceled (Bibars 1987). However, the 1985 Nairobi Conference 
which was held two months after the implementation of the  regressive 1985 law 
created strong lobby pressuring the government to restore the law. Immediately 
after the conference, a new version was enacted which provided women some of 
the advantages that they gained by the Personal Status Law of 1979 (Al-Ali 2000: 
75). 
 The struggle over the Personal Status Law which also allowed open 
discussion of such taboo subjects as clitoridectomy and contraception in 1985 was 
accompanied by the emergence of independent feminist activism in Egypt 
(Ahmed 1992: 214). Resistance to the implementation of the law in the course of 
widespread nation-wide discussion also demonstrated various strands within the 
movement. For instance, whereas Arab Women’s Solidarity Association 
(established in 1981) – which was vocally arguing against the Islam as a point of 
                                                 
10
   Among the outcomes of the fact that Islamist forces comprised powerful constituency in Egypt  
are the establishment of Islamic schools, both informal and formal social welfare groups and 
even banks (Zaki 1995). 
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reference for the advancement of women’s rights – launched a campaign to 
preserve it, Progressive Women’s Union (PWU) – affiliating with the leftist 
Tagammu Party – argued against the 1979 Law based on the idea that the law was 
passed unconstitutionally by Sadat. PWU’s opposition against the appeasement 
policies towards Israel as well as the open door policies of Sadat were major 
reasons behind their arguments against the law (Al-Ali 2000: 76). It can thus be 
argued that the discussion over the 1985 Personal Status Law made leftist women 
stand with Islamist groups for this very instance. As Al-Ali (2000: 76) remarks, 
“This debate clearly shows the ‘instrumentality’ of women's issues and their 
submergence into broader political questions. What was at stake was not the 
actual substance of the issue, but a joint opposition against Sadat’s general 
policies”.11 
 Even though Mubarak followed pro-democracy policies to some extent 
mainly due to the external factors and forces mentioned above, the Egyptian state 
not only pressured the activities of Islamic groups, but also implemented 
repressive measures towards feminist activists and organizations. For instance, 
Law 32 of 1964, which had been in practice since Nasser, resumed to be 
performed as means of monitoring voluntary organizations including feminist 
organizations and human’s rights associations, “with regard to their fields of 
activity, number of members allowed, number of organizations, within a particular 
region, record keeping, accounting and founding” (Al-Ali 2000:67). However, the 
level of pressure on NGOs was based on the political atmosphere, specifically 
determined by the international arena. 
 The international community’s pressure became evident by the middle of 
the 1990s, particularly after the International Conference of Population and 
Development, 1994 and Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, 1995. 
The level of control of the state over feminist organizations manifesting itself in 
Law 32 of 1964 decreased during this period (Al-Ali 2000:67). In 1998, with 
                                                 
11
  Nonetheless, nationwide discussion during the 1980s as to whether the revision of the Personal 
Status Law is constitutional opened up the floor for a shift from popular nationalist discourse 
merely focusing on women's rights in the public space – where women were supposed to 
participate in education, job market and politics to some extent – towards more holistic 
approach (Ahmed 1992, Hatem 1993). While prior to the 1980s, women's rights within the 
‘private’ or family domains were being overlooked; throughout the post-infitah period, 
previously denied aspects of women’s rights issues begun to be emphasized (Al-Ali 2003). 
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international donor organization’s support, Egyptian NGOs achieved to persuade 
the government to tighten the control over NGOs
12
 (Al-Ali 2000: 80). The 
tendency (see, for example: Daly 2010, Zuhur 2011, Al-Ali 2003) in the 
scholarship detects the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing 1995 as the 
starting point of  NGOization of feminist activism in Egypt. As of 2000, Al-Ali 
(2000: 81) remarked that “While there is certainly room for negotiation over goals 
and means, it is obvious that the international women's movement as well as 
agendas of funding agencies influence and partly direct[ed] the movement in 
Egypt”.13 In addition to this, in 1993,  in preparation for the NGO forum in 
cooperation with the International Conference of Population and Development 
1994, state-appointed Gender and Equality Committee approved the project for 
procedural amendments in PSL which finally became law in 2000 (Law No. 1). 
 In 2000, the National Council for Women (the NCW) was established with 
tremendous visibility of Suzanna Mubarak. Following Elsadda’s own words, 
“Gradually, what many activists feared when the National Council for Women 
was established came true: the NCW competed with existing women's rights 
organizations, sought to appropriate women's activism and work and tried to 
monopolize speaking on behalf of all Egyptian women” (Elsadda 2011: 93). The 
NCW members became immensely visible in local, regional and international 
media and forums while the voices of independent feminist organizations were 
being marginalized. I had noticed the tendency among my interviews that the 
NCW is sometimes being blamed of taking credit for the accomplishments 
succeeded by NGOs. On the other hand, they also acknowledge positive efforts 
made by the NCW. In this sense, my respondents greet the Law No.1 of the year 
2000 which granted women the right to no-fault divorce (khul’) in that this law 
                                                 
12
  However, I was told by many interviewed women that it was, and is still, also common   
      phenomenon in Egypt that various feminist organizations in Egypt registered with the Office of 
Property and Accrediation in an effort to avoid the danger of being demolished by the Ministry 
of Social Affairs. 
13
  Despite the growing number of NGOs triggered the emergence of independent feminist   
      activism, according to the literature (Daly 2010, Zuhur 2011), the major influence of 
tremendous growth in the number of feminist NGOs in Egypt on the struggle for women’s 
rights during the Mubarak regime was the NGOization of the feminist movement. The 
opportunity of making a professional career canalized many activists to compete for job 
opportunities which in turns caused rivalry and struggle for funding possibilities among 
      different feminist groups (Ibid.). 
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was campaigned by the activists for more than a decade.
14
 However, it seems that 
the NCW-led damages to the struggle for women’s rights, in general, outweighed 
the contributions of the NCW. Amal, a member of Nazra for Feminist Studies, 
talked to me regarding the role that the NCW played during the Mubarak era:  
 
The creation of the NWC was promising. The NCW was expected to 
formulate policies and come up with strategies to advance women's 
rights and the nation. But the problem is that they were very 
politicized and served the regime's own interests in the end. The 
council competed with the feminist organizations rather than 
supporting them. They got donors' money and co-opted our efforts. 
 
The establishment of the NCW in this sense can be conceptualized as 
“gender conditionality” (Kandiyoti 2011) which allowed the regime to support 
women's rights “moderately” as long as the regime can use women’ rights issues 
as a bargaining tool in the international arena. The case of the NCW also shows 
the increased influence of international agencies in the 1990s and 2000s and 
regime’s ‘appropriate’ response to their demands concerning the struggle for 
women's rights. 
 
2.5 Subconclusion  
Even though Egyptian feminist activists achieved impressive gains, they also 
faced a set of constraints throughout the 20
th
 and 21
th
 century. Nasser’s period 
(1952-1970) was marked by the crackdown on independent feminist organizations 
and the preservation of conservative Personal Status Law of the 1920s and the 
1930s in return for having suffrage, the right to run for government offices and 
diminishing gender gap in education, social mobility and employment for women. 
When it comes to Anwar Sadat's presidency (1970-1981), despite the fact that the 
progressive law of 1979 granted women legal rights in marriage, polygamy, 
divorce and child custody, the regime did not have apparent program to advance 
women's rights and discouraged independent feminist organizations. Under 
Mubarak, the same gendered phenomenon resumed. Even though the 
                                                 
14
   It is also interesting to see that Suzanne Mubarak’s tremendous effort during the ballot in the   
      parliament earned this law the title of Suzanne’s Law (Elsadda 2011). 
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establishment of the NCW was promising, women's rights agenda soon was to be 
co-opted by the leadership of former first lady Suzanne Mubarak which also 
limited the freedom of association. 
In short, it appears that patriarchal bargaining with the state outlines a 
significant aspect of the historical Egyptian feminism until the end of the 
Mubarak regime.  
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3 Theoretical Framework 
 
To answer the research question, postcolonial feminist theory is used. Before 
providing a postcolonial feminist theoretical foundation and the essential aspects 
of postcolonial feminism being relevant to my research, firstly, I will offer 
applicable aspects of postcolonial scholarship in order to demonstrate a nexus 
between postcolonialism and postcolonial feminism in section 3.1. In sections 3.2 
and 3.3, primary aspects of postcolonial feminist scholarship will be discussed. In 
order to do that, firstly, underlying commitments and concerns of western 
feminism will be explained as postcolonial feminism was born out of critique 
towards western feminism. Then, in section 3.3, the goal of postcolonial feminism 
will be briefly discussed. Section 3.4 discusses the notion of ‘patriarchy’ within 
the framework of postcolonial feminist scholarship. 
 
3.1 Postcolonial Theory 
In its broad sense, postcolonial theory refers to the investigation of the experience 
of colonialism as well as its past and present outcomes both in ex-colonial 
societies and in the western world, following the national liberation movements of 
the majority of the world’s countries (Quayson 2000: 2). Even though 
postcolonialism implies the end of colonialism, the novel forms of colonialism are 
also analyzed within this framework. In the light of this, colonialism is not tackled 
merely with regard to economic or military penetration. Various social, religious 
and cultural aspects also take up some important spaces within the context of 
(post)colonialism. 
 Generally speaking, postcolonial scholarship aims at abandoning 
Eurocentric narratives in social sciences as the most powerful current grand 
narratives are Eurocentric. The domination of Eurocentric premises in the social 
sciences is the result of post-Enlightenment European constitution and history 
what Barriteau calls “the enlightenment promise” (Barriteau 1998; cited in Sa’ar 
2005). According to Sa’ar (2005: 684), “This promise of a better quality of life 
assumes a linear view of progress, a rational approach to human affairs (…) as 
part of a mode general inclination to compartmentalize complex reality”. 
 Dirlik (1997: 329) depicts the goal of postcolonial scholarship as being the 
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destruction of all respective separations between ‘center’ and ‘periphery’, and 
other dichotomies which are purportedly “a legacy of colonialist way of thinking 
and to reveal societies globally in their complex heterogeneity and contingency”. 
Stuart Hall (1996) also emphasizes that processes of decolonization among both 
the formerly colonized societies and the colonizers indicate the postcolonial 
period. However, even though postcolonial period is marked by a wide array of 
changeovers and transition towards the decentring of the West (Al-Ali 2002), it is 
not to suggest that all earlier conceptualization of the world or all power relations 
between formerly colonized and colonizers are over (Rattansi 1997). Various 
scholars emphasize that postcolonial times also embrace “neo-colonial 
dependency” on the first world and the rise of powerful local elites (Hall 1996, 
Rattansi 1997, Said 1993).
15
 Therefore, it should be noted that postcolonial 
scholarship does lessen neither the role of the colonizers nor that of the neo-
colonial powers. On the contrary, it attempts to remove the binary oppositions 
such as east versus west, colonized versus colonizer, First World versus Third 
World, local versus global, traditional versus modern, or religious versus secular 
by annulling the old colonizing-colonized contrasts. 
 
3.2 Postcolonial feminism: The Critique of Mainstream (Western) 
Feminism 
Stereotypical representations create boundaries and make firm and separate what 
is in fact fluid and much closer to the norm than the dominant value systems care 
to admit. Many definitions of the ‘West’, and categories such as ‘western 
feminism’ are similar to the process that, in Said’s words articulated almost two 
decades ago, seeks “to intensify its own sense of itself by dramatizing the distance 
and difference between what is closer to it and what is far away” (Said 1978: 55; 
cited in Al-Ali 2000: 33). 
 At divergent specific periods over the course of the last hundred years, 
women’s rights and human rights activists considered the concept of feminism 
with unambiguous doubt (Johnson-Odim et. al. 1991). As Sa’ar (2005: 686) points 
                                                 
15
  I am using the notion of ‘First World’ to refer to “so called developed, capitalist, industrial 
countries, roughly, a bloc of countries aligned with the United States after World War II, with 
more or less common political and economic interests: North America, Western Europe, Japan 
and Australia”. (Nationsonline 2015) 
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out, there are two underlying reasons for this. First is the constant disposition of 
western feminism, to put it differently, mainstream feminism, to entirely address 
their struggle within the framework of gender discrimination whereas staying 
away from focusing on other forms of struggle such as ethnic conflicts in gender-
mixed settings. This resulted in western feminism solely dealing with those strata 
of women who are well-educated, middle-class and ‘white’. Postcolonial 
feminists argue that in such a way that ethnic research glossed over the gender 
aspect, feminism was lacking the impacts of ethnicity as well as the history of 
colonialism (Abu-Lughod 1998). The colonized subject, therefore, has been 
mainly regarded as the man, whereas women of colonized countries has been 
categorically seen as ‘white’ since this perspective has stepped away the 
intersection zone in which ‘coloured’ and ‘women’ are intertwined (Loomba 
2005). 
 From this point of view, it can thus be argued that the main preoccupation 
of western feminism is western women who relatively and moderately position 
themselves by the side of liberal order.
16
 In case this specific focal point 
considerably is marked by concerns with gender discrimination, personal 
experiences and premises of marginalized women are being ruled out. This 
inclination arguably makes western feminism exclusionary practice and ideology 
leaving out the ‘rest’. 
 The second reason is more polemical: Extensive discontent particularly 
prevalent in the ‘Third World’ with historical identification of feminism consisting 
in cultural imperialism or colonialism.
17
 On the basis of this, Sa’ar (2005: 686) 
claims that “Feminism became widely construed as a form of ideological 
imperialism, despite the fact that indigenous feminisms sprang up throughout the 
colonized world as long ago as the early twentieth century”. Relevant aspect of 
addressed discontent is a large-scale discursive link between the progressive 
discourse of modernity aiming at re-configuration the lives of women in the 
Muslim world and level of cultural development of these countries (Abu Lughod 
1998, Badran 1996, Hafez 2011). 
                                                 
16
   By ‘liberal order’, I imply the system working and being sympathetic mainly with the US and   
      other industrial countries. 
17
   By ‘Third World’, I specify developing countries of Africa, Asia and America. 
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 It can thus be argued that the link between political disempowerment, 
culture, and women stems from the specific historical crossroad of modernity and 
colonialism, which expeditiously acquired “the status of an ahistorical truism” 
(Sa’ar 2005: 687). In the following section, I will touch upon principal aspects of 
postcolonial feminism. 
 
3.3 The Aim of Postcolonial Feminism  
In its broadest sense, “'postcolonial feminism' is an exploration of and at the 
intersections of colonialism and neocolonialism with gender, nation, class, race, 
and sexualities in the different contexts of women’s lives, their subjectivities, 
work, sexuality, and rights” (Schwarz et. al 2004). Postcolonial feminist scholars 
particularly scrutinize the construction of the ‘Third World Woman’ by referring 
to singular monolithic subject in (mainstream/western) feminist texts (see: Abu-
Lughod 1998, Mohanty 1988, Spivak 1999). The definition of colonization used 
in this master's thesis is, in some respects, discursive through which performed by 
the western feminist writings that “discursively colonize the material and 
historical heterogeneities of the lives of women in Third World, thereby 
producing/representing a composite, singular ‘third-world woman’ —  an 
image which appears arbitrarily constructed but nevertheless carries with it the 
authorizing signature of western humanist discourse” (Mohanty 1988: 62). 
 Mohanty (1988: 78) draws attention to the abundant literature assuming 
‘Women’ as a category of analysis in the attempt to make binary generalizations 
specified below: 
 
Interestingly enough, however, almost all the texts assume ‘women’ as 
a category of analysis in the manner designated above. However, in 
the particular texts under question, each text assumes ‘women’ have a 
coherent group identity within the different cultures discussed, prior to 
their entry into social relations. Thus, Omvedt can talk about ‘Indian 
Women’ while referring to a particular group of women in the State of 
Maharashtra, Cutrufelli about ‘Women of Africa’ and Minces out 
‘Arab Women’ as if these groups of women have some sort of obvious 
cultural coherence, distinct from men in these societies. The ‘status’ or 
‘position’ of women is assumed to be self-evident because women as 
an already constituted group are placed within religious, economic, 
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familial and legal structures. 
 
 Accordingly, as a backlash to western feminism, postcolonial feminist 
scholarship attempts to illustrate that women is not an already produced and 
consistent group with the same interests irrespective of their ethnic or racial 
location, which stands for the religious affiliation to some extent, universally 
(Huston 1979, Kristeva 1980, Mohanty 2014). This contested cross-cultural 
validity attributed to women all around the world assumes a homogeneous notion 
of the oppression towards women which served the representation of an ‘average 
third-world woman’. As Mohanty (1988: 65) clearly dwells on, “This average 
third-world woman leads an essentially trun-cated life based on her feminine 
gender (read: sexually constrained) and being ‘third world’ (read: ignorant, poor, 
uneducated, tradition-bound, religious, domesticated, family-oriented, victimized, 
etc.)” in contrast to the portrayal of western women as educated, modern and 
having control over their own bodies. 
 That is why Rosaldo (1980) accuses (western) feminists of approaching 
other cultures as being archaic and of presenting themselves as the norm referent 
in such a twofold analytic. Western feminists, Rosaldo (1980: 392) argues, 
consider non-western women as “ourselves undressed and the historical 
specificity of their lives and of our own becomes obscured”. As postcolonial 
critique reminds us that ‘modern’, or ‘civilized’ as a rigid conceptualization(s) 
implies the clear articulation of the ‘non-modern’, or ‘uncivilized other’ –in order 
to clarify and delimit ‘modern’s own attributes by mostly detailing what ‘modern’ 
is not. This process of authorization marked by an absolute delimitation is itself 
ruptured. Having placed itself as both modern and indigenous, the ‘women 
question in Egypt’ is a perfect example of how local nationalist discourse 
enunciated in very intricate ways with colonial discourse. It is an ambiguous 
construction of both identity and discrepancy with the West (El Shakry 2007: 
158).  
 
3.4 Patriarchy  
Attempts at confining Egyptian feminism with an enclosure of western 
colonialism preserves a colonialist scripting rooted in binary oppositions. By 
hiding the complexity of feminist activism that surfaced against a background of 
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anti-colonial struggle in Egypt, such reductions exclude the emergence of new 
researches seeking to map out the unique conditions regulating relations between 
the political leadership and women. This section thus places the articulation of 
‘patriarchy’ within the context of postcolonial scholarship. Underlying attributes 
of the concept will also be presented in line with the Egyptian case. The concept is 
then extended to a pervasive analysis of the bargain between Egyptian secular 
feminists and the political leadership in ‘Analysis’. 
 Firstly, I would like to address the notion of the ‘patriarchy’ in its wider 
sense. In order to do that, I use Lerner’s (1986: 239) definition to simplify the 
term: 
 
The manifestation and institutionalization of male dominance over 
women and children in the family and the extension of male 
dominance over women in the society in general. It implies that men 
hold power in all the important institutions of society and that women 
are deprived of access to power. 
 
 Nonetheless, as Mohanty (1988: 78) shows, above cited understanding of 
patriarchy is likely to shape the world as if it is made out of binary and 
dichotomies “where women are always seen in opposition to men, patriarchy is 
always necessarily male dominance, and the religious, legal, economic and 
familial systems are implicitly assumed to be constructed by men”. The 
assumption of patriarchy designing women as an already coherent set of ‘victims’ 
with indistinguishable interests implies an understanding of gender difference as 
well as patriarchy which of both can be applied universally. 
 It thus appears that the implications that ‘patriarchy’ reveals are far from 
monolithic (for various examples, please see: Anzilotti 2002, Hardwick 1998, 
Kandiyoti 1988, Lee et. al. 2000, Miller 1998). Whereas socialist feminists 
advocate a very limited usage, offering to examine the relationship between 
patriarchy and class; radical feminists are sympathetic with a broader usage in 
order to employ the term to any form of male domination (Kandiyoti 1988: 275) 
Therefore, it is problematic to appeal to the notion of the ‘patriarchy’ even in the 
attempt to briefly address the monolithic conceptualization of male dominance, 
where women are situated as congruent recipients of vertical power relationship 
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between men and women, irrespective of their class, ethnic or racial location. 
 At this juncture, I would like to draw some attention that even in the same 
country patriarchy can take different forms and can thus influence women’s 
strategies and coping mechanisms differently. This is overly determined by the 
background of women based on their class, and particularly in our case, the level 
of religiosity and political ideologies. This is especially relevant in a country such 
as Egypt which is at the crossroads of three continents and which hosts competing 
discourses between religious and secular ideologies as well as between colonial 
culture and anti-colonial struggle past to present. The suspension of the patriarchal 
bargain between secular Egyptian feminists and the state during the MB period 
and then the reemergence of it throughout El-Sisi’s presidency clearly show that 
different political actors being in power in different periods, despite their 
commonalities, can lead women to choose different strategies while negotiating 
with the state.  
 The framework while outlining the notion of the ‘patriarchy’ in this section 
could overcome what I shall call ‘postcolonial premises’. Explicit critique of 
binary portrayals such as ‘oppressed Third World women’ (particularly in those 
countries where majority of people are Muslim) or totalizing approaches to 
women, which see women as a set of category with identical desires and 
deprivations cross-culturally regardless of geographical or cultural differences, 
play an important role in underplaying the differences between the “intimate inner 
workings of culturally and historically distinct arrangements between the genders” 
(Kandiyoti 1988: 275). The postcolonial feminist scholarship comes on stage at 
this very point by attempting to undermine the monolithic assumption of women 
which suggests that the woman is an already produced and consistent group with 
the same interests and lack of resources. 
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4 Methodology 
 
This chapter is designed in order to frame the methodological choices made. In 
Section 4.1, research design of the study is explained. The choice of the case is 
introduced in section 4.2, followed by a discussion of data collection. Section 4.4 
outlines interview method as well as ethical considerations, researcher’s position 
and limitations within the research. In section 4.5, a brief description of 
transcription and analysis of collected material are placed. 
 
4.1 Research Design 
The type of research question establishes the choice among various research 
methods (Shavelson et. al. 2002: 99-106). Case studies are applicable when a 
research focuses on either an explanatory question – such as “how or why did 
something happen or has happened?”– or descriptive question – such as “what has 
happened or what is happening?” (Yin 2011: 10-12).  A modern dictionary of 
sociology (Theodorson et al. 1970) explains case studies as follows: 
 
A method of studying social phenomena through the thorough analysis 
of an individual case. The case may be a person, a group, an episode, a 
process, a community a society, or any other unit of social life (...) 
This approach rests on the assumption that the case being studied is 
typical of cases of certain type, so that through intensive analysis 
generalizations may be made which will applicable to other cases of 
the same type. 
 
 While ‘what’ questions are exploratory in nature, as ‘who’, ‘how many’ 
etc. questions are, ‘how’ questions and ‘why’ questions are rather explanatory and 
“likely to lead to the use of a case study, history, or experiment as the preferred 
research method” (Yin 2011: 10). If the researcher wants to know the answer such 
questions as ‘who’ and ‘how many’ – types of questions which are justifiable for 
conducting exploratory research – would be more likely to rely on a survey or an 
examination of archives. On the contrary, it is more plausible to use a case study if 
the research requires the researcher to ask questions concerning “operational links 
needing to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence” (Ibid.). 
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 This master’s thesis addresses an explanatory question and seeks to answer 
the how and why questions (Yin 2011), instead on merely focusing on “revealing 
the average strength of a factor that causes an effect” (Given 2008: 69). In other 
words, rather than seeking causal linkage between events of factors, I aim at 
expanding the understanding of the phenomenon of interest – namely,  
implications of different political leaderships on secular feminist activists’ 
strategies which in turn determine the status of the patriarchal bargain between the 
state and the women – and explaining the ‘how’s and ‘why’s of the case. Although 
no generality will be claimed in the end, relevant parts of the analysis can be 
adapted to similar cases in other settings. 
 The study is of a feminist engagement. Feminist scholars do case studies 
for the identical goal that non-feminist scholars conduct them. Such goals as 
obtaining overarching awareness of a single or small number of cases, illustrating 
the limit of generalizations as well as analyzing the specific process over time are 
common (e.g. Reinharz et al. 1992, Yin 2011) . However, feminists concerns with 
case studies arise out of admiration of repairing the negative sides of previous 
researches which have been clouded by misogyny, gynopia and male-dominant 
theorizing (Reinharz 1992: 167). Because, as Reinharz (1992: 168) puts it, 
“Traditionally, the presence of women was limited to their being mentioned as 
there. Women's being, when noted at all, was defined in terms of men's needs”. 
Accordingly, feminist interest in case studies began as a backlash to this gendered 
misinterpretation. Case studies of previously overlooked individual feminists and 
members of feminist groups are predominant examples of this appreciation of 
feminist viewpoint. 
 There is an abundant literature of feminist case studies of organizations 
(see, for example: Reinharz el. al. 1992: 164-75). These studies can allow us to 
realize male-dominant settings of theorizing the certain phenomenon. In addition, 
case studies of women's movements also serve to illustrate the nature of these 
structures sometimes even by confronting the accepted categories of feminism. 
Needless to say, one of the rigorous motivation for this study is my strong feeling 
that western feminism glosses over the particular settings in studying feminism in 
Egypt. 
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4.2 Case Selection 
This study is a qualitative case study of feminist activism with a particular 
emphasis on secular feminists’ strategies within a set of concrete constraints, 
namely patriarchal bargains. Particular focus is given to those activists who live in 
Cairo in that the contemporary feminist activism in Egypt, as during the previous 
decades, primarily limited to big cities, particularly to Cairo. However, 
components of Egyptian secular feminism differ in regard to various institutional 
structures and activities. Ad hoc networks being organized around specific issues 
and tasks are established and collapsed – once the particular aim is achieved – by 
activists who are engaged in other groups or activities at the same time. Others are 
NGOs with more apparent frameworks than ad hoc groups and decision-making 
structures, formal groups which were created in the attempt to avoid state 
monitoring over organization, as well as a number of individual women who work 
independently through their specialty or non-affiliated or loosely-affiliated 
feminists who refraining from being part of institutional frameworks. Therefore, I 
tried to place the heterogeneity of secular feminist organizations and different 
priorities in the movement by transferring various voices into this research. 
Participants of this research are people from NGOs, formal groups and 
independent feminists. 
 
4.3 Data Collection: Qualitative Semi-Structured Interviews, 
Secondary Sources and Domestic and International Legal 
Instruments 
Qualitative semi-structured interviewing as a data collection method is the most 
appropriate in answering the research question.
18
 The major aim of the semi-
structured interviewing is not to homogenize participants’ comprehensions and 
experiences on certain issues, but to take into consideration and uncover 
participant's various, unique point of views on the everyday world.  Semi-
structured interviewing as qualitative data gathering technique is the method 
highlighting the importance of opening quotes (Reinharz 1992: 18). Open-ended 
interviewing maximizes discovery and “produces non-standardized information 
                                                 
18
   I tend to interchange the terms, ‘semistructured’, ‘in-deptht’, ‘intensive’, ‘open-ended’. 
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that allows researchers to make full use of differences among people. In this 
study, open-ended, semi-structured interviews with members of Egyptian secular 
feminist movement conducted. 
 However, “a major strength of case study data collection is the opportunity 
to use many different sources of evidence” (Yin 2014: 119). That is why in 
addition to conducting semi-structured interviews, I used domestic and 
international agreements and secondary sources as the supplementary source of 
evidence. According to Yin (2014: 107), the most significant use of 
documentation is to authenticate and strengthen evidence from other sources. 
Documents thus are also helpful in confirming the specific names of 
organizations, people, places and dates that respondents addressed during 
interviews. Throughout my case study research, I also tried to verify correct 
spellings and names through documents for the most of the time. More 
importantly however, documents provided me specific details and other 
perspectives about the particular cases. I drew inferences from documents and 
come up with new questions that I will mention in the following chapter. Types of 
documents that I used in order to gather additional data include applicable 
domestic and international agreements, secondary sources including NGO and 
UN human rights reports, media reports and scholarly articles.  
 
4.4 Interviewing Egyptian Female Feminists  
Both non-affiliated and affiliated women who define themselves as ‘feminist’s or 
‘women’s rights activists’ were interviewed during the research. It was not my 
aim to focus on finding people with strong organizational affiliations to interview, 
although four respondents were members of NGOs with clear agendas and 
decision-making bodies. In addition to respondents who are involved in either 
formal or informal feminist groups with different but interrelated focuses such as 
prevention of sexual assault against women and improvement of women's civic 
and political rights, I also had an opportunity to do interviews with three 
individual feminists. Having the conversation with loosely or non-affiliated 
women’s rights activists allowed me to observe a wide range of positions and 
attitudes towards women's rights issues, current political context and various 
political orientations within the feminist movement. 
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 The first process was to design the interview guide. I divided the interview 
into three parts in line with themes I intended to focus on. The first part comprises 
of questions about the personal background, life-stories and type of activism 
getting involved. The second set of questions deals with selected aspects of 
Egyptian politics and women’s rights issues in the previous periods. The third 
part, the fourth part, the fifth part and the sixth part aim at gaining understanding 
on the women’s rights activists’ thoughts and stances both about El-Sisi’s 
presidency between June 2014 and June 2015 and the Brotherhood’s policies 
between 2012-2013. 
 Due to temporal and monetary limitations of conducting fieldwork, I 
conducted 4 online semi-structured face-to-face Skype interviews and 3 semi-
structured, in person interviews with female activists. All Skype interviews were 
conducted with activists being in Cairo during our online meetings. Even though 
semi-structured, in person interviews were not done in Cairo – but in, Lund, 
Stockholm and Umeå – I spent time with some of the respondents in different 
settings and I witnessed their conversation with their feminist and non-feminist 
Egyptian peers (in English) on women’s rights in Egypt which I myself 
sometimes got involved. While four of the people I interviewed are members of at 
least one network or group, three interviewees are working without specific 
organizational affiliation. All in-person interviews were carried out in cafes and 
restaurants and most of them were conducted during one meeting. All interviews 
were tape-recorded and conducted in English. The actual length of recording 
ranges from 40 minutes to 1 hours and 20 minutes. 
 The participants were determined through two methods. The first method I 
used was getting contact information of feminist organizations and groups in 
Cairo from different sources ranging from academic channels to web searching 
and then e-mailing them. Each time, I outlined my subject of interest and asked 
them if they could provide me with personal e-mail addresses of interested 
members. As I pointed out from the beginning that I would not travel to Cairo, I 
tried to arrange in-person meetings with activists who are temporarily inside 
Sweden for academic reasons such as conference or Master’s degree or short-
lasting visits even though they actually live in Cairo. The second method was 
related with the first one: snowball method. In some cases, interviewees helped 
me to find more people with which to conduct in-person interviews and online 
 
 39 
interviews when physical meetings were not possible. 
 
4.4.1 Ethical Considerations, Researcher’s Position and Limitations 
Each interviewee was invited to voluntarily take part in the research. Aside from 
explaining the purpose of the thesis, I provided my interviewees with written 
information about the research including my contact information before shifting 
to the actual interview process. Privacy matters were addressed from the inception 
of the research to every respondent. Every interviewee was informed about the 
confidentiality of research data. Also, I made clear that interviews would be 
recorded only if the interviewees felt comfortable with it. In order to protect the 
anonymity of interviewees, I used pseudonyms.  
 This study places itself within the framework of postcolonial feminist 
theory, according to which, academic research cannot be confined to the study 
which is “(...) done within a specific academic context [that] emphasized the role 
of social scientists as collectors and analysts of objectively verifiable data” while 
treating interviewees as ‘data provider’ (Oakley 1985; cited in Reinharz 1992: 
27). On the contrary, being listened to and respected, but not merely being ‘data 
providers’ caused active participation of respondents to the research. 
 Simmons (1988, cited in Brown 1996: 20) sees awareness of researcher's 
“biases, blind spot, and cognitive limitations (…) as high a priority as theoretical 
knowledge”. Self-discovery thus is vital to finding out more about qualitative 
research (Brown 1996, Mehra 2001). According to Thomsson (2011: 47) the 
researcher should read a lot of resources including non-academic ones through 
which s/he can learn essential aspects of the subject of interest in order to control 
the prejudice. In the attempt to overcome researcher bias and subjectivity as much 
as possible – which are generally perceived as being inevitable by the majority of 
quality researchers – I have read plenty of academic and non-academic articles 
and books on Egyptian feminism from various sources. 
 When it comes to gender factor, I do not think that being a male was a 
disadvantage in persuading people to be interviewed. On the contrary, the reaction 
I got for most of the time was encouraging. People I got in contact with for 
interviews usually greeted me for my interest in Egyptian feminism in that 
scholarship on gender in the Middle Eastern Studies is generally occupied by 
female researchers. On the other hand, throughout my research I felt that my 
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‘Turkish background’ provided me with an open gateway to accessing Egyptian 
feminists. Being educated in one of the  Middle Eastern countries and being a so-
called ‘non-westerner’ made me feel comfortable with the way many interviewees 
have regarded me ‘good’ and ‘trustworthy’. My conversations with interviewees 
also encouraged me to rethink the ‘west-east’ division and my own position as a 
person who always feel in-between more critically once again. 
 Due to small samples, most qualitative research cannot generalize to a 
population. Instead, in qualitative research the generalizability question can be 
explained in more realistic style: “Why will knowledge of a single or limited 
number of cases be useful to people who operate in other, potentially different 
situations?” (Given 2008: 372). It should be also pointed out that research 
participants in my study only presents a minimal segment of the members of 
secular feminist activism in Egypt. That is why it is impossible to draw de facto 
conclusions about the current state of secular feminism in Egypt. Rather, the 
results should be seen as a contribution for anyone aspiring to raise their 
comprehension of the subject of interest (Thomsson 2011: 30). 
 
4.5 Data Analysis and Interpretation   
An inductive thematic analysis was employed in order to analyze the collected 
data. Throughout this process, meanings as well as structures that respondents 
implicitly expressed were tried to make more clear (Braun et. al. 2006). I 
organized main themes after transcribing interviews by conducting thematic 
coding (McEvoy 2010: 133). In the following, I modeled the codes and drew 
relevant information to my case study in line with the type of answers received. 
Finally, the data was interpreted corresponding to themes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 41 
5 Analysis 
 
In this chapter, I will examine two chronological political leaderships in the post-
Mubarak Egypt, namely, the MB’s political leadership and El-Sisi’s political 
leadership, through an analysis of secular female feminists’ strategies in dealing 
with them. This chapter ends with an investigation of the conditions to the 
suspension and then the reemergence of the patriarchal bargain with these 
leaderships. In the first section, I will look at the conditions contributing to the 
suspension of the patriarchal bargain with the Brotherhood regime. In the second 
section, the reasons behind the reestablishment of the patriarchal bargain taking 
place during El-Sisi’s presidential period between June 2014 and June 2015 will 
be discussed. Throughout the analysis, along with feminist activist’s own 
interpretations, I will place my own conclusions while unpacking particular 
conditions leading to the patriarchal bargain between Egyptian women’s human 
rights activists and the leadership during the MB regime to be interrupted which 
existed in the previous periods and then the reemergence of the bargain during El-
Sisi’s presidential term between June 2014 and June 2015. 
 
5.1 The Brotherhood Regime: Non-Bargaining with the 
Leadership 
This section seeks to find an answer to the question, ‘why did not bargaining with 
the patriarchal Muslim Brotherhood regime seem useful as a negotiation tool for 
Egyptian secular feminists to maximize their power and opportunities?’. The 
results show that there are three main reasons paving the way for the suspension 
of the patriarchal bargain between Egyptian secular women activists and the state 
during the MB regime. These are the Brotherhood’s policies on women’s 
economic development, their policies and attitudes towards international 
agreements and declarations on women’s rights, the 2012 Constitution and the 
Brotherhood’s perspective on combatting sexual violence against women.  
 
5.1.1 The Brotherhood’s Economic Policies Aimed Towards Women 
There is a consensus among interviewed secularist feminists that the FJP 
attempted to separate its women’s empowerment policies from that of secular 
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feminist movements during its brief legislative and executive experiences. Sarah, 
a journalist and nonaffiliated feminist, told me that the Brotherhood regime took 
advantage of negative public perception identifying women's rights activism with 
the political corruption in the Mubarak administration, “it’s top-down secularist, 
western-oriented agenda and the NCW's activities”.19 Dalia, Marian and Nancy 
also mentioned that the connotation that secular feminism hold allowed the MB to 
make their gender agenda  —  which merely focused on the basic needs of less 
privileged women — legitimate in the eyes of the majority of Egyptian people 
who have suffered poverty for many years.  
 The political history of the country being revealed by scholarly articles 
verifies interviewees’ accounts. For instance, in her 2011 article Elsadda (86) 
potently articulates that “key obstacles that women's rights activists will face in 
the months and years to come is a prevalent public perception that associates 
women’s rights activists and their activities with the ex-First Lady, Suzanne 
Mubarak, and her entourage-that is, with corrupt regime politics in collusion with 
imperialist agendas”. After the 2011 Revolution, critics of these reforms called 
them ‘Suzanne’s Law’.20 
 What Elsadda (2011) says for feminist activists is particularly relevant for 
secular feminists given the postcolonial political and economic settings of the 
county. Western pressure for the restoration of women’s rights issues 21 , the 
increased dependence of the country on the US and its donor organizations such 
as the World Bank and the IMF (particularly beginning from the Sadat’s rule) as 
well as the colonial history of the country
22
 have resulted in backlash and 
                                                 
19
   As Abou-Bakr (in Parvaz 2012), a leading figure in the Women and Memory Forum, argues that 
Islamists began calling for cancellation of ‘Suzanne’s laws’ introduced by Suzanne Mubarak 
“to initiate divorce, greater muscle and in custody battles and more”. According to Abou Bakr 
(Ibid.), these demands emerged “under the pretext that these laws were corrupt because they 
were created under [ousted President] Hosni Mubarak's regime”, but this is “a false 
politicisation of the laws and an excuse to rescind certain women's rights - such things lead to 
the cancellation of the women's quota in parliament.” 
20
  This particular phenomenon can be called “first lady syndrome”. The phrase is coined by Okeke 
(1998). 
21
   International community's pressure became clear by the middle of the 1990s, particularly after 
the International Conference of Population and Development, 1994 and Fourth World 
Conference on Women in Beijing, 1995. The level of control of the state over feminist 
organizations manifesting itself in Law 32 decreased during this period. In 1998, with 
international donor organization's support, Egyptian NGOs achieved to convince the 
government to tighten the control over NGOs (see: Al-Ali 2000: 80). 
22
   Megahed et. al. (2011) investigate how reigning western powers during the colonialism period 
inadvertently empowered the grassroots opposition to the secular norms associated with so-
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grassroots legitimacy against all things widely associated with the European 
culture including the secular ideas or emancipation and equality of women 
(Megahed et.al. 2011, Younis 2006). In other words, the enormous influence of 
the western institutions on domestic politics during both the colonial and the post-
independence periods as well as what the MB can call “corrupt regime politics in 
collusion with imperialist agenda” (Elsadda 2011: 86) allowed the MB regime to 
oppose legal and social reforms, especially those concerning women’s rights. 
 Taking into consideration aforementioned details, it is easier to make sense 
of why the FJP wanted to differentiate its politics from that of secular feminist 
movements. However, it is equally important to answer the question, ‘through 
which policy did the MB regime attempt to differentiate its agenda?’. Hatem 
(2013) argues that the FJP addressed the situation of impoverished women during 
its first brief experience in the parliament. The party tackled women’s rights 
merely from the economic perspective and turned its attention to health insurance 
policies for female households (Ibid: 14). The prominence given to the economic 
dilemma of Egyptian women by the FJP was aiming at underplaying the role of 
secular feminists who are blamed of being elitists with such “secondary interests” 
as sexual and reproductive rights and violence against women (Hatem 2013). 
Through women's health insurance policy aimed towards female-headed 
households which corresponded to almost 30 percent of Egyptian families, the 
MB regime sought to represent itself as the supporter of average Egyptian women 
(Ibid: 14).  
 The arguments above should not be misunderstood. For the sake of 
clarification, I should point out that many people I interviewed did not refute the 
urgent need to address the poverty and underdevelopment level of Egyptian 
women. Also, all of them are convinced that improving the situation of Egyptian 
                                                                                                                                     
called “European values” particularly in regard to issues on empowerment of women’s rights. 
They (401-2) argue that by means of legal reforms made during the pre-independence period, 
colonial powers “gradually increased their control over education in the region. This control 
took the form of imposing French and English as the languages of instruction at all levels”. For 
instance, in the course of the colonial rule in Egypt, the British endeavored to anglicize 
language of instruction in the state schools. Thus, as Megahed et. al. (2011) claim, in an 
attempt to build up a visible pattern, some religious groups began to voice their discontent with 
the state of gender issues due to the political and socio-economic transformation of the country. 
These arguments also seem useful to explain continuing fundamentalist Islamic revival as 
being the most important symbols of resistance against all things connected with Europe, 
including women’s rights standards and violations against women acknowledged by various 
conventions and declarations. 
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women should be widely acknowledged not only by the government bodies but 
also among NGOs. As Al-Ali (2000: 153) maintains, “all the women involved in 
the Egyptian’s women movement in one way or another acknowledge that within 
the wider framework of fighting of the conditions of underdevelopment, which 
affect society as a whole, there are issues of particular relevance to women”.  My 
findings are also similar to that of Al-Ali’s. The majority of the interviewed 
activists’ approach characteristically pays great attention to the issues of 
underdevelopment and poverty. As Asra puts it: “We did not clearly feel and 
conflicts with their (the Freedom and Justice Party) efforts when it comes to 
improvement of the situation of average Egyptian women. Of course poverty is 
among the issues that should be addressed first”. I encountered similar reactions 
on many occasions.  
 However, when I asked activists about their priority issues, they often 
regard economic issues as being contingent upon other issues such as illiteracy, 
consciousness raising and legal awareness campaigns or policies. Therefore, the 
link between improving the situation of women in Egypt and other problems 
addressed by feminist activists such as eradicating illiteracy, changing existing 
laws and to legalize women’s rights are extensively recognized. The majority of 
the activists emphasize that along with the alleviation of poverty, the most 
important issue that should have been focused on during the FJP government was 
to advance women’s rights, but not reversing them.  
 
5.1.1.1 Welfare Policies or the Tool for Hiding the Secret Agenda? 
Many women I interviewed found it difficult to ‘rely on’ the idea that the FJP 
aimed at empowering Egyptian women. The majority of them concurred with the 
view that the FJP’s attempts to define itself as being in harmony with the average 
Egyptian women’s needs conflicted with the party’s efforts to undermine the legal 
status of women in both the public and the private sphere. Throughout the 
interviews, I also detected that the majority of activist are convinced that the 
Islamists’ calls for the cancellation of laws — those passed under Mubarak which 
all interviewed activists had viewed positively — which resonated in the media 
and legal courts before the first free parliamentarian election of 2011-2012 (Al 
Arabiya 2013, Pratt 2015, Hussein 2012) showed “real intentions” of the MB 
government (Asra). Amongst them; rising child custody rights for mothers, the 
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criminalization of FGM, fixed parliamentary quotas for women and the rights to 
unilateral divorce are of particularly importance (Sorbera 2014, Wickham 2013: 
253). Amal exemplifies this: 
 
It does make always sense to campaign for NGOs and to formulate 
policies for governments. You cannot struggle for women’s equality if 
women are destitute of basic means of survival. However, what the 
Brotherhood regime was trying to do was to make people believe that 
we (secular-oriented feminists) are elitists, and interested in so-called 
corrupt western values instead of turning to real needs of Egyptian 
women. If they were thinking of the Egyptian women and their needs, 
they would not have tried to reverse our gains that we got in the 
previous terms.  
 
 Therefore, even though the majority of activists regard alleviation of 
poverty as being high on the list of priorities, they did see the Brotherhood’s 
economic agenda on women’s rights deceptive. As Nancy points out that secular 
feminist are outraged by the fact that the FJP differentiated itself from secular 
feminists by emphasizing their allegedly ‘western-oriented’ agenda and its 
‘secondary, alien interests’. She says that “while they were planning on regressing 
women’s rights which were legalized in the previous periods, there was no reason 
to support their economic policies for activists”. I received very similar reactions 
on many occasions when it comes to ‘dichotomy’ between the Brotherhood’s 
willingness to advance the situation of Egyptian women and its gender 
discriminatory stance. Many of the interviewed people also find it misleading to 
support the Brotherhood regime considering their stance in regard to international 
agreements such as the CEDAW and various UN Declarations. The next section 
provides secular activists’ own perspectives regarding the Brotherhood’s 
viewpoints concerning international agreements and declarations. 
  
5.1.2 The Brotherhood’s Policies and Attitudes Towards International 
Agreements and Declarations on Women’s Rights 
Egypt has obligations emanating from general international law and various UN 
human rights conventions to make provisions to eradicate all forms of violence 
against women and girls as well as to provide survivors with full reparation. 
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Egypt is responsible for guaranteeing the rights of women and girls under a 
number of UN human rights instruments such as the ICCPR, ACHPR and the 
CEDAW. Among these conventions, the CEDAW is of particular importance in 
the eyes of my respondents due to the fact that it was purely designed to eliminate 
all forms of discriminations against women (see also: Amnesty 2015: 72-3).
23
 
 General recommendation No. 5, on Article 4.1, of the CEDAW (the 
CEDAW 1979) “recommends that State Parties make more use of temporary 
special measures such as positive action, preferential treatment or quota systems 
to advance women's integration into education, the economy, politics and 
employment”.24 However, many activists I interviewed emphasized the idea that 
although Egypt ratified the CEDAW in 1981, the Brotherhood rule tended to resist 
the active participation of women in the government. The majority of respondents 
particularly underscored Brotherhood-dominated government’s role in 
abandoning the women’s quota system in the parliament despite Egypt’s 
commitments to meeting its gender obligations under international conventions, 
as Asra did, when I posed the question on the FJP’s attitudes towards international 
conventions: “What we firstly had to fight against is the regressive, anti-women 
laws such as the cancellation of quota system introduced by the Islamic 
government which are in conflict with the CEDAW”.25 At this point it should be 
remembered that  women consisted of less than 2 percent of the parliament 
throughout the MB dominated parliament, while the minimum quota for women 
parliamentarians was 12% under the presidency of Mubarak which allocated 64 
                                                 
23
   As a state party to the CEDAW, Egypt is obliged to: “take appropriate and effective measures 
to overcome all forms of sexual and gender- based violence, whether by public or private act; 
ensure that its laws against family violence and abuse, rape, sexual assault and other gender-
based violence give adequate protection to all women and girls, and respect their integrity and 
dignity; and provide appropriate protective and support services for survivors, and gender-
sensitive training of judicial and law enforcement officers and other public officials to ensure 
the effective implementation of the convention” (the CEDAW 1979). 
24
   In addition to this, according to General Recommendation No. 23, on Article 7, of the CEDAW 
(the CEDAW 1979) “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country and, in particular, 
shall ensure to women, on equal terms with men, the right: (…) To participate in the 
formulation of government policy and the implementation thereof and to hold public office and 
perform all public functions at all levels of government”. 
25
  By accepting the Convention, States commit themselves to take all appropriate measures to 
achieving gender equality between men and women “through ensuring women's equal access 
to, and equal opportunities in, political and public life -- including the right to vote and to stand 
for election -- as well as education, health and employment (…), legislation and temporary 
special measures, so that women can enjoy all their human rights and fundamental freedoms” 
(the CEDAW 1979).  
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seats in the parliament lower house to women (Toliver 2013, UN 2013).  
 Apart from the new law passed by the Egyptian parliament during the MB 
dominated government, equal attention has been paid to declarations made by the 
MB on the international legal instruments on women’s rights. Regarding the 
Brotherhood’s negligence of international conventions on women’s rights, Amal 
and Nancy emphasized the reactions that the Brotherhood regime gave to the 57th 
session of the Commission on the Status of Women in March 2013 (UN CSW 57; 
hereinafter). In March 2013, the MB condemned the UN declaration to end all 
forms of violence against women and girl (UN CSW 57) by claiming “it 
eliminates Islamic values, and seeks to destroy the family (...) which would lead 
to social disintegration” (Ikhwanweb 2013). Dalia emphasized that by officially 
condemning the UN document on combating violence against women, the MB 
also conceded that there is no room for stopping the violence against women, but 
encouraging it. Dalia also mentioned that there is a belief appearing among 
secular feminists “like her” that Islamist governments cannot be democratic and in 
favor of gender equality. She told me that even though she participated in anti-
Mubarak demonstrations and welcomed the MB's election victory, she “would 
rather stand by the military anymore”. Marian drew my attention to the MB's 
“medieval position” regarding sexual freedom of women and gender self-
determination: 
 
They are against sexual freedom, freedom to decide people's own 
gender and gender of their partners. They are against the legal 
minimum age of marriage for females.They have acknowledged that.
26
 
To be honest, I prefer Mubarak regime to live.Yeah, it is true that we 
were having the NCW which co-opted our own activities. And without 
a doubt, the NCW was serving the interests of the regime. But at least, 
albeit by foreign pressure, the Mubarak administration promoted 
women’s rights in compliance with UN conventions irrespective of 
whether they are clashing with Islamic principles and so-called family 
values. 
                                                 
26
  According to the statement in the website of the Brotherhood (Ikhwanweb 2013), “this 
declaration [the declaration announced after the 57th Session of the UN Commission of the 
Status of Women (UN CSW 57)] if ratified, would lead to complete disintegration of society 
(…) [by] granting full sexual freedom to decide their own gender and the gender of their 
partners (ie, choose to have normal or homo-sexual relationship), while raising the age of 
marriage”. 
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 To conclude, in the context of conflicts with Islamists, particularly in 
regard to the FJP’s stance which was seemingly in stark opposition to the “global 
standards for achieving gender equality” (UN Brussels), secular-oriented 
feminists appear to enunciate similar series of discourses, values and fears. A 
declaration made by the UN Commission on the Status of Women on Equal 
Rights for Men and Women (UN CSW57) and the Brotherhood’s attack against it 
by defining the declaration as being have “destructive tools meant to undermine 
the family as an important institution” (Ikhwanweb 2013) are of particular 
importance for the majority of activists in condemning the Brotherhood regime’s 
policies towards international agreements. 
 
5.1.3 The Egyptian Constitution of 2012 
The 2012 Constitution, in general, seems to introduce deeply religious provisions 
which opened the door for a regression in women’s rights for a large number of 
activists. This is not to say that Egyptian secular activists categorically tackle the 
religion and religious way of living as being antithetical of women’s rights.  
 At this juncture, it is also significant to maintain that among the activists I 
interviewed, the majority of them stated that their religious observance has much 
to do with customs and cultural tradition rather than religiosity. For example, such 
practices as fasting during Ramadan and/or visiting families and friends during 
Eid al-Fitr (Feast of Breaking the Fast) are mostly understood as being involved in 
the cultural event and particular lifestyle.
27
 In this sense, the majority of secular-
oriented feminists tend to tackle religion and cultural practice synonymously as 
long as it is not used against the advancement of women’s rights. Sometimes 
religiously and cultural practice can thus come together, as expressed by Dalia: 
 
I believe in Islam. I pray and I sometimes fast. However, I drink. For 
me, those things do not contradict each other. Because I am religious 
with my own set of values and standards. In contrast to Islamists, 
therefore, I am totally against marginalizing others and reject the issue 
of discriminating others on the pretext that they are not abiding by  
                                                 
27
   It should be pointed out that my findings on values attributed to religious observance by 
secular activists are similar with that of Al-Ali’s (2000) on her analysis on secular activists. 
This correspondence shows us the preservation of some set of values and beliefs shared among 
secular activists regardless of which generation they belong to. 
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Sharia law. There are specific values in Egyptian culture such as 
solidarity and helping others. Religion is there as a background, not as 
a point of departure. 
 
 Nancy points out that religious observance can refer to only one aspect of 
everyday life and cannot thus represent the basis of women’s lives: 
 
You can be religious. But even in this case, the religion would 
compose only a limited part of your own existence and ideology 
among many other things. Social norms, personal experiences, similar 
way of life and thinking, and the interlace of different cultural 
practices are not less important than religion in making the source of 
values in people’s lives.   
 
 Even though religion in itself does not seem to unconditionally contradict 
the advancement of women’s rights, there is a consensus among all activists that 
women’s role in the public life was substantially undermined in the 2012 
Constitution. The Constitution specifically neglected the rights of women in the 
name of protecting religion. Article 219 introduced Sharia law as the principal 
source of country’s legislation (Bastawy 2013, the 2012 Constitution) by 
declaring it the “fundamental rules of jurisprudence”. A lot of activists told me 
that state authorities had used the provision as a base to perform discriminatory 
practices against women and girls. Therefore, fear is common feeling among 
activists when it comes to Sharia law. The majority of them believe that under 
Sharia law many of the basic rights of women are likely to be disregarded 
regardless of whether these laws are stipulated under the international law. In this 
regard, Asra perceived the 2012 Constitution both “anachronistic and irrational”:  
 
It was anachronistic, because through the Constitution, the 
Brotherhood tried to undermine all of the gains that Egyptian women 
obtained in the past in the name of religion. It was irrational because 
they thought that people would remain silent.  
 
Nancy emphasized the quasi-judicial power granted to Sharia scholars at 
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Al-Azhar University
28
 in Cairo, who were “to be consulted on matters of religious 
laws” (the 2012 Constitution, Article 4). After telling me that she is a Copt and 
self-proclaimed believer, Nancy addressed her account of religion, and 
particularly the Sunni Islam which was the point of departure of the 2012 
Constitution: 
 
The Brotherhood regime granted authority of religious institutions so 
that they can close the doors on others. This is the case in Egypt. In 
2012, the Brotherhood tried to discriminate against non-Muslims as if 
Egypt is an Islamic state relying on a particular religious 
denomination.  
 
 It is not unexpected to detect that Coptic activists have a particular stake in 
the discussion about religious provisions in the 2012 Constitution. Asra points out 
that “their position” in the society were weakened during the Brotherhood era: 
 
Our second-class status — you know, we are both woman and Coptic 
— got worsen during the brotherhood era. The 2012 Constitution 
allowed them to discriminate other religions. Exclusionary discourses 
and politics against Copts increased during the Brotherhood rule. 
Now, imagine how to be a Coptic woman in Egypt.  
 
 Both scholarly and newspaper articles confirm interviewee’s accounts that 
many Copts felt that the 2012 Constitution has less to do with religious equality. 
During the Brotherhood era, violence against Copts rose (see, for example: 
Armanios 2013, Malsin 2014). The majority of Copts felt threatened by the 
Brotherhood regime who followed sectarian agenda and had failed to prevent 
them from being assaulted by extremists (please see: Malsin 2014).  
 Asra and Nancy leave me in no doubt that both of them are preoccupied 
with the issue of the Sunni-Islamic foundation of the 2012 Constitution. Likewise, 
particular attention has been paid to the fact that the Constitution allowed the 
justification for discriminatory policies against the people who are not Sunni 
Muslim. 
                                                 
28
   Al-Azhar is the oldest degree-granting university in Egypt and is famed as one of the most 
prestigious university in Sunni Islam. It is also associated with Al Azhar Mosque in Cairo.  
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 In the context of exclusion of women from the public space, Amal, Hafah 
and Sarah drew my attention to Article 11 of 2012 Constitution which provided 
that “the state promotes morality, decency and public order” (The 2012 
Constitution). This article allowed ‘morality police’ to ‘guard’ public spaces in 
Cairo (IBAHRI 2014: 16). 
29
 In short, regardless of their religious affiliations, 
when it comes to religious-based articles included in the 2012 Constitution, I got 
adverse reactions from all respondents. 
 
5.1.4 The Brotherhood’s Attitudes Towards Sexual Violence against Women 
According to a survey by UN Women published in April 2013 (cited in, FIDH et. 
al. 2014) [during which the Brotherhood was still in power], 99.3% of Egyptian 
women told that they were sexually abused while 91% of them reported that they 
do not feel secure in the public space. Throughout my interviews it appeared that 
there is much similarity among the period under the Mubarak regime and the post- 
revolutionary SCAF period, the Brotherhood and the El-Sisi regime when it 
comes to extent of systematic sexual assault and violence used. Concerning the 
similarity among patterns, as Amal, from Nazra for Feminist Studies, told me that: 
“Always the same scenario… Baltagiyya man30 systematically isolated a women 
protestor from her friends and surrounded her. A victim is encircled by a group of 
this men attempting to clutch her clothes and she is penetrated by their hands. 
This did not change after the revolution. They (paid thugs) are still there”. Some 
man verifies claims about the continuation of ‘baltagiyya system’. They argue that 
they were sponsored under the Mubarak regime and since the revolution they 
have been paid by the state security forces (Al-Shishani et.al. 2012).
31
  
                                                 
29
  The report by International Bar Association Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI 2014: 30) also 
reveals firsthand testimonies regarding the experiences of women rights activists: “Not only 
women but also Coptic Christians were in danger of being side-lined in the judiciary because 
of a policy – both overt and covert – of Islamicisation. Certain key articles in the 2012 
Constitution entrenched the relevance of religious principles to be applied by judges and 
delegates were told that this could present a problem for the judiciary in the future as one such 
principle is that a Christian cannot exercise authority over a Muslim and that women should 
not judge men.”  
30
  Baltagiyya is an Egyptian word that refers to gangs of hired thugs by the regime to attack 
opposition protesters (Jacinto 2011). Nonpolitical baltagiya men showed up in Egypt in the 
1980s and the 1990s, and then Egyptian security forces decided to pay them well and train “to 
use sexualized brutality (from groping to rape) in order to punish and deter female protesters 
and male detainees, alike” (Amar 2011).    
31
  That is not to say that all sexual harassment cases are perpetrated by paid thugs. Women have 
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 “The truth is, regardless of who has been in power, the Egyptian 
authorities have undermined women’s rights and failed many Egyptian women” 
(Amnesty International 2015:5). Successive governments have used violence 
against women and failed to acknowledge the challenges faced by women as well 
as the extent of the dispute. Nowadays, sexual violence against women is a 
widespread phenomenon in Egypt both in the private sphere and in the public 
space. Those responsible include state actors such as security forces and non-state 
actors like unknown attackers in the street (Amnesty International 2015:5, Nazra 
et. al. 2013). 
 It is not possible to find official data on crimes of sexual assault as 
Egyptian state authorities do not collect the data on the rape crimes and other 
types of sexual assault. However, I detected that there is a pervasive perception 
shared by all of the interviewed people that sexual harassment and mob attacks 
against women are more common than ever in the public space in the post-
revolutionary Egypt. In addition to this, the post-Mubarak regimes’ patterns seem 
to be more violent towards women and comprised increasingly multiple and 
public sexual assaults. 
32
 
 That is why rather than the nature and extent of sexual assault, Egyptian 
feminist activists mostly focus on whether or not the certain political leadership 
has a national strategy such as reforms or constitutional changes to combat 
violence against women. I detected amongst the majority of interviews that there 
is a consensus regarding the Brotherhood regime’s unwillingness to confront 
gender-based violence. 
                                                                                                                                     
been also sexually assaulted by officers from the police and Special Forces Unite, especially 
during the SCAF rule (FIDH et. al. 2014: 14-5). 
32
   Ironically, increasing violence against women in the post-revolutionary regimes also paved the 
way for new tools for challenging the sexual harassment of women such as the establishment 
of anti-sexual assaults initiatives. Nancy says that “we have also revolutionized discourses and 
practices for challenging the sexual violence and patriarchy in general in contrary to a 
discourse of protection that encourages fear among women after the revolution”. Sarah talked 
about these practices, to put it differently, the creation of anti-sexual harassment initiatives: “If 
you look at the efforts to combatting against the mass sexual harassment — you know it existed 
in Egypt before even though it increased by 2011 due to the bigger gatherings with the 
prominent presence of women — you see that people formed rescue teams to keep women away 
from the assaults. Consciousness is raising in the society against the sexual assault and those 
initiatives are getting volunteers more and more”. Hafah drew my attention to the gender equal 
structure of some of the anti-sexual harassment movements: “They way of keeping women 
away from mob assailants also revolutionized and changed.  The rescue teams are not just 
made up of man, but also women also try to rescue other women from the hands of attackers” 
. 
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 Regarding the sexual violence against women, a lot of respondents regard 
the MB regime’s attitudes and actions undemocratic and gender-discriminative. 
Amal explained this: 
 
During Morsi's brief presidential time, they had no will to advance 
women’s rights. Even though both Nazra's and other feminist NGO's 
attempts, they were very clear about not including the gender 
perspective in the Constitution. They did not see the role for women in 
the public space. For example, take a look at this... Despite reported 
epidemic mob sexual assaults and systematic rape cases during anti-
government protests, Muslim Brotherhood deputies of Shura Council's 
human rights committee accused women of subjecting themselves to 
assaults
33
. 
 
 Nancy points out that, by discriminating against women, the MB tried to 
impose the idea that the role women can play in the social life cannot conflict with 
the familial issues. According to her, “Women's professional work, political roles, 
and education were acknowledged inasmuch as they are at variance with the 
interest of family during the MB era”. 
 
5.1.5 Subconclusion 
Bargaining with the patriarchal leadership did not seem a useful tool for secularist 
women during the Muslim Brotherhood regime. It appears that the majority of 
interviewed women’s disdain for the Muslim Brotherhood leading to the 
suspension of the patriarchal bargain emanates from the widespread conviction 
that the MB’s politics were not democratic, inclusive, and most importantly, 
contradicted gender-equality. In the eyes of many of them, there existed an 
obvious effort on the part of the MB regime to deteriorate Egyptian women’s 
acquired political and civil rights and their status in the society. The MB’s efforts 
                                                 
33
  Regarding the increasing wave of the sexual assault against women at the beginning of 2013, 
Reda Al-Hefnawy (cited in Taha 2013), the FJP member of The Shura Council Human Rights 
Committee, states that “women should not mingle with men during protests” and asked, “How 
can the Ministry of Interior be tasked with protecting a lady who stands among a group of 
men?” (Ibid). Moreover, in the same session, Salafi Al-Nour Party — the second biggest party 
in the parliament after the FJP with the 27.8% of all votes — member Sarah Abdel Salam 
explicitly meant that women were responsible for sexual assault: “Women sometimes cause 
rape upon themselves through putting themselves in a position which makes them subject to 
rape” (Ibid.). 
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to marginalize secular feminist activism by means of welfare policies arguably 
targeting the empowerment of ‘ordinary Egyptian women’, religious and gender-
discriminative provisions included in the 2012 Constitution, the MB’s 
unwillingness to combat sexual violence, and the Brotherhood’s backlash against 
international agreements and declarations on women’s rights resulted in the 
backlash against the MB regime.  
 
5.2 Women’s Bargaining with the El-Sisi Regime 
This section discusses factors that contributed to activists’ willingness to bargain 
with the El-Sisi rule. The investigation is conducted in three subsections, namely, 
‘constitutional reforms’, ‘combatting against sexual violence’ and ‘towards a new 
patriarchal bargain’. While findings show the reestablishment of the patriarchal 
bargain between Egyptian secular feminists and the political leadership taking 
place during El-Sisi’s presidency, it is argued that the majority of activists’ 
antipathy with the Brotherhood rule contributed to secular activists’ decision to 
support the military regime even though the regime threatened the independence 
of feminist groups.  
 
5.2.1 The Egyptian Constitution of 2014 
After the defeat of Morsi, a drafting committee – consisting of Islamists, albeit a 
limited number of people – started to work on amending the Constitution which 
was passed by Morsi’s regime in 2012.34 In an effort to prove how the new regime 
would be different from the MB rule, a committee was appointed to draft a new 
constitution that can arguably overturn the preceding “Islamization efforts” (Al-
Ali 2013, Pratt 2015). The 2014 report published by the IBAHRI underlined the 
fact that the 2014 Constitution has more potent protection for women. According 
to the Article 11 of the 2014 Constitution (the 2014 Constitution), “State commits 
to achieving equality between women and men”. In the IBAHRI report (2014:14), 
it is also mentioned that the 2014 Constitution provides that the state is 
responsible for protecting women from arbitrary implementations, and 
                                                 
34
  Amr Moussa (cited in IBAHRI 2014: 15), head of the drafting committee for the 2014    
     Constitution, claims that “an invitation was extended to all Islamic groups, including the MB.   
     Of the parties of political Islam, only the Salafist Al Nour responded (the Brotherhood did  
     not)”. 
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particularly for guaranteeing women’s rights to be appointed to the state 
institutions. In Article 11, “The State shall take the necessary measures to ensure 
the appropriate representation of women in the houses of representatives, as 
specified by Law. The State shall also guarantee women’s right of holding public 
and senior management offices in the State and their appointment in judicial 
bodies and authorities without discrimination” (The 2014 Constitution). 
 In our conversations, all of the respondents regarded this effort as an 
important milestone given the MB’s publicly stated objection against the idea of 
‘gender equality’ (please see: Ikhwanweb 2013). Regarding the 2014 Constitution 
and its explicit commitments to the advancement and protection of women's 
rights, Nancy told me: 
 
It is a cause for hope among feminist activists. However, we 
should wait the rest to see how they are going to implement our 
hope. 
 
Marian exemplified this: 
 
There is a huge struggle in Egypt now. A struggle between feminist 
NGOs and state institutions. We are forcing them to implement the 
laws. And we will keep forcing them. The current situation is not as 
bad as that of during the MB era. At least, the El-Sisi rule is advancing 
women’s rights constitutionally, and they are not  talking about 
anymore if female genital mutilation should be legal or not. 
 
 Both the joint report published by Egyptian feminist organizations (FIDH 
et. al. 2014) and IBAHRI (2014) acknowledge that the 2014 Constitution has 
much more effective protection for women's rights. As Amal, Nancy, Hafah and 
Dalia emphasized a couple of times that while according to the 2012 Constitution, 
which was passed by the MB government, the Article 11 provided that “the state 
promotes morality, decency and public order” which allowed morality police to 
“guard” streets from “indecent” deeds of the citizens, this provision has been 
completely abolished from the new constitution (the 2012 Constitution). It is not 
possible to come across the notion of the ‘decency’ in the 2014 Constitution 
anymore. Moreover, Article 11 of 2014 Constitution specified that “state commits 
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to achieving equality between women and men” and stipulates that the 
government is obliged to take the necessary measures “to ensure appropriate 
representation of women in the houses of parliament, in the manner specified by 
law” and protects women’s rights of be “appointed to judicial bodies and entities 
without discrimination” (the 2014 Constitution). 
 During our conversations, a lot of activists brought my attention to Article 
11 of the 2014 Constitution several times. Sarah explained the reason behind the 
article’s inclusion into the Constitution: 
 
It was an amalgam of a lot of reasons. The committee wanted to 
distinguish themselves from the Islamists. They wanted to show that 
how they are women-friendly, unlike the MB. Through this article, 
they explicitly admitted the fact that women’s participation in the 
revolution is valuable. 
 
 In addition, the majority of interviewed people drew my attention to 
Article 74 of the 2014 Constitution which forbids the formation of political parties 
on the basis of religion (see also: IBAHRI 2014: 16). Their sympathy with the 
Article 74 arguably shows that they associate the lack of Islamist parties and 
organizations with the mitigation of patriarchal politics and settings.  
   
 
 5.2.1.1 Constitutionals Reforms: Just on Paper?  
On the other hand, whilst the state has expressed its commitment to advancement 
of women’s rights, it is not likely to be able to argue that new articles in the 
Constitution devoted to state’s responsibility to achieve gender equality has been 
put into action so far. In a way, Amal was a perfect microcosm of thoughts 
expressed by activists when it comes to the clash between new regime’s official 
policies on women’s rights issues and its implementations: 
 
What has been done so far during El-Sisi’s presidential period to a 
large extent is the flurry. New constitution has very good articles 
about women’s rights. However, overemphasized gender perspective 
of the new constitution has not been implemented so far. Feminist 
organizations have been calling for these articles to be applied. For 
example, even though we have been documenting more than 500 
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cases of mob sexual assaults and gang rapes during the period 
between June 2012 and June 2014, no one has been held accountable. 
Yeah, there is political will that they showed. But I do think this is not 
enough at all. 
 
 Moreover, despite gender-specific amendments in the 2014 Constitution, 
the new constitution failed in how the equality can be constituted without 
providing specific quota to guarantee women’s representation in both legislative 
and judicial bodies. Nevertheless, even though the majority of the people I 
interviewed agree that despite a number of provisions incorporated in Article 11 
of the 2014 Constitution including those providing combat against both verbal and 
physical violence against women and equal participation of women in the houses 
of parliament and judicial bodies have remained words on paper so far, it is still 
viewed as a big step forward towards amending the 2012 Constitution.  
 It can thus be said that although the El-Sisi administration expressed its 
commitment to the advancement of women’s rights and gender equality, legal 
gains contradicted the annulment in the freedom of association and expression. 
Since the ouster of Morsi, women’s demonstrations have been substantially 
excluded from public space (Pratt 2015). For instance, feminist activist did not 
organize a rally to celebrate International Women’s Day for the first time after 
Mubarak’s withdrawal. It is also interesting to see that many activists did not 
challenge the fact that the 2014 Constitution empowers the army and there is no 
mention of fixed parliamentary quotas for women included in it. Unprecedented 
levels of military tribunals of civilians during both the transitional SCAF period 
of 2011 and Morsi’s presidency did not stop, but have increased in the polarized 
environment in which the El-Sisi regime attempt to stifle on human rights 
organizations and civic initiatives (Mcrobie 2014). The majority of people 
touched upon neither these issues nor provisions allowing the use of military trials 
for civilians (please see: Amnesty International 2015). 
 According to the Article 75 of the 2014 Constitution, all citizens are 
allowed to form NGO. The article provides that “[s]uch associations and 
foundations shall have the right to practice their activities freely, and 
administrative agencies may not interfere in their affairs or dissolve them, or 
dissolve their boards of directors or boards of trustees save by a court judgment” 
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(the 2014 Constitution). However, by early 2015, the government passed the law 
which tasked with the ministry to determine the legal status of an association 
based on the restricted activities of Article 11 (Pratt 2015).  
 Since the approval of the Constitution, a lot of NGO are still trying to gain 
the freedom of association, a right given by the Constitution. However, in 2014, 
the government passed the law requiring that all civil society organizations should 
register with the Ministry of Social Solidarity and Justice which jeopardizes NGO 
independence (Ibid.). Following this, El-Sisi issued an amendment to the Penal 
Code so that individual receiving funding from a foreign country would be 
sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine no less than LE 500.000 (Hamed 2014). 
The amendment concerns Article 78 of Penal Code “with the aim of pursuing acts 
harmful to national interest or destabilizing to general peace or the country’s 
independence and its unity” (cited in Hamed 2014). Departing from this, it is clear 
that the new amendments and laws jeopardize the ability to regulate and 
standardize the feminist initiatives that have emerged since 2011. Pratt (2015) 
rightly argues that “Even established women’s rights NGOs face challenges when 
it comes to building upon achievements in women’s legal rights given the new 
constraints on civil society organizations”. New regulations also seem 
controversial given the fact that the government’s unwillingness to exercise its 
commitments on gender equality. 
 
5.2.2 Combating Against Sexual Violence  
As of 25 January 2014, more than 100 cases of sexual assault including several 
cases of rape in Tahrir Square and its vicinity were documented by four Egyptian 
women’s rights organizations; FIDH, Nazra for Feminist Studies, OpAntiSh and 
Tahrir Bodyguard (please see: FIDH et. al. 2014). According to the report (FIDH 
2014: 3), more than 20 women said that they were sexually attacked by 
perpetrators affiliated with the Central Security Forces. Nancy explained this 
institutional and “pervasive violence and structural discrimination against 
women” as: “it is not the case to get to the police station. Once I let them know 
that I was harassed, they harassed me too. The problem is not the law but the 
masculine mentality within the society” (see also: FIDH et. al. 2014: 5). 
 Hafah mentioned that the public outrage over the video of the sexual 
assault of a woman during El-Sisi’s inauguration for his presidential victory also 
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paved the way for inclusion of the Article into the Constitution (please see also: 
Howeidy 2014). Therefore, along with the desire of the aforementioned 
committee to market itself as the successor of “the dominant narrative of Egypt’s 
modernity, of which progress on women’s rights is seen as a key marker” (Pratt 
2015), as Hafah says, “the sexual harassment of a woman captured on video in 
Tahrir Square contributed the announcement of national strategy to prevent the 
all forms of violence against women” (see: also Nader 2014). Incorporation of an 
amendment on anti-sexual harassment law to the Egyptian penal code took place 
during the same period (Ahramonline 2014). This allowed the prosecution of 
some cases of sexual assaults and specifically gang rapes in Tahrir Square and its 
vicinity (Pratt 2015). But as Marian told me, the majority of sexual harassment 
cases, including gang rapes, are still not investigated. Pratt’s article (2015) and the 
report on the sexual violence against women in the public space (FIDH  et. al. 
2014: 17) on this issue also verifies Marian’s statements on investigated cases.   
 El-Sisi’s visit and apology on his third day in office to the victim of a mob 
sexual assault that occurred among thousands of people celebrating his election 
victory is of capital importance to interviewees (see also: Kirkpatrick 2014). Most 
of the respondents welcome the fact that El-Sisi became the first president to 
recognize sexual violence in the history of the Egyptian politics. Dalia told me 
that “It was a much more vigorous personal commitment to combating sexual 
violence against women that were ever made by Mohamed Morsi or Mubarak”. 
 A lot of interviewed people told me several times that particular 
phenomena regarding sexual assault against women have not changed after the 
ousting of Morsi. These are the nature and extent of sexual assault and security 
forces’ involvement in sexual crimes. However, it seems that even though El-Sisi’ 
rule has failed to implement the existing laws to prevent violence against 
women
35
, nor to provide with fair investigation to hold criminals to account, the 
majority of activists approached El-Sisi’s leadership much more positively. In this 
sense, it could be maintained that Egyptian secular feminists tend to pay great 
attention to de jure protection of their rights under constitutional guarantees after 
                                                 
35
  Regarding this, a report by Amnesty International (2015: 17) clarifies that “The approaches of 
successive Egyptian governments’ to addressing violence against women has mainly consisted 
of deflecting criticism, without taking real steps to tackle the roots of the problem, to properly 
address reported incidents or break the cycle of impunity. While the authorities have 
announced many new initiatives, there is little detail on their implementation”. 
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having witnessed annulment of their rights during the MB regime.  
 
5.2.3 Towards the Reestablishment of the Patriarchal Bargain  
At this point, it should also be recalled that while he was the head of military 
intelligence in March 2011, El-Sisi attempted to defend the virginity test carried 
out on 17 women after they were beaten and arrested by military staff during anti-
Mubarak protests, allegedly to “protect[ing] girls from rape, and the soldiers and 
officers from accusations of rape” (BBC 2014). When it comes to women’s rights, 
similar to the language of the MB (İkhwanweb 2013) who described a 2013 UN 
Women Report for Gender Equality as “deceitful”, as well as those political 
leaderships ruling the country before the revolution, the new regime also ascribed 
the patriarchal terms of honour and shame to female body. Even though in the 
statement – which was conflicted with his earlier speech about the virginity test – 
after visiting several women who had been sexually attacked and hospitalized 
during his inauguration speech El-Sisi addressed the government’s new agenda to 
combat to sexual assaults against women, he used the same patriarchal jargon 
similar to that of the MB albeit less explicitly: “Our honour is being assaulted in 
the streets. This is unacceptable and we can't allow one more incident like this to 
happen” (cited in Kingsley 2014). However, although the majority of people 
gladly mentioned his visit, apology and his commitment to the establishment of a 
commission assigned with dealing with sexual crime (Ibid.), a few interviewees 
drew my attention to the fact that similar to the previous Islamist government, the 
El-Sisi regime also has reduced women’ s bodies as symbols of honour or shame.  
 Underplaying Egyptian women’s role to the country’s reputation and such 
notions as honor and shame attributed to the female body are also problematic. 
However, the majority of women did not mention new regulations allowing the 
El-Sisi’s rule to strictly monitor the establishment or functioning NGOs. Neither 
did they talk about the regime’s discourse that reduces women’s bodies to the 
symbols of collective honor which in turn may cause to blame the sexually 
assaulted women for what they experienced. There are only two people, who 
addressed the difficulties that women's right initiatives faced during El-Sisi’s 
presidency. Hafah told me: 
 
NGOs were very active during Mursi's time. I am not saying it was 
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better because they have the better ideological system of beliefs when 
it comes to the idea of freedom. It was because they were not able to 
entirely control over NGO to impose censorship. They [the 
Brotherhood] did not have ability and time to do that.  Now they [the 
El-Sisi administration] repressed every kind of opposition: Political 
parties, NGOs, anything that can be critical against them. Now, they 
control everything. We are even getting behind our abilities. They [the 
El-Sisi administration] constantly rises the authoritarian oppression by 
cracking down NGOs, non-affiliated activities such as peaceful 
demonstrations and rallies. Look at this... They publicly support 
sexual violation of women, but even we, [anti-sexual harassment 
movements] cannot get government approval from them to be able to 
officially work. 
 
 Sarah mentioned that there is not much distinction between the 
Brotherhood and the El-Sisi regime. For her, both governments are very 
conservative. However, she said that “it was easier to raise an opposition and to 
create a public debate, which does not exist now”. Sarah also underscored the fact 
that the human rights violations in the country escalated throughout the El-Sisi 
administration. Sarah’s accounts correspond to the findings included in Human 
Rights Watch World Report 2015. According to the report (Human Rights Watch 
2015) “The government consolidated control through the constriction of basic 
freedoms and a stifling campaign of arrests targeting political opponents. Security 
forces and an increasingly politicized judiciary — apparently unnerved by rising 
armed group attacks — invoked national security to muzzle nearly all dissent”. 
 
5.2.4 Subconclusion 
It appears that the gains made in legal rights of women along with military 
regime’s commitment to women’s rights have led women activists to reestablish 
the patriarchal bargain with the state during the El-Sisi rule. Even though new 
regulations that allows the government to monitor NGOs activities and to restrict 
freedom of association, the majority of activists preferred to address the regime’s 
commitment to fight against sexual assault of women and its gender-equality 
policies which were included in the 2014 Constitution. It is also surprising to 
detect that only one respondent drew my attention to El-Sisi’s statements which 
reproduce similar patriarchal jargon that had been used by the Brotherhood 
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regime serving to identify Egyptian women’s role with the country’s honor. 
Despite having some reservations concerning the implementation of laws, 
interviewed people reveal that secular Egyptian feminists have restored the 
patriarchal bargain with the political leadership during El-Sisi’s presidential term 
between June 2014 and June 2015 in return for abandoning independent feminist 
organizing and the reproduction of patriarchal discourse in return for protection of 
their rights.  
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6 Conclusion 
 
Drawing on the Egyptian case, I demonstrated the reasons why secular feminist 
women activists did not see negotiating with the Brotherhood regime as a useful 
tool, whereas they chose to bargain with the military regime. I named the former 
case as the suspension of the patriarchal bargain while defining the second case as 
the reemergence of it. 
 Based on my interviews which were conducted with the activists and 
domestic and international legal instruments, secondary sources including UN 
human rights reports and NGO reports, scholarly articles and media report, I 
found out that the credit given to the El-Sisi regime by the majority of women 
activists cannot be separated from the disdain of the Muslim Brotherhood. That is 
not to say that the overthrown Brotherhood regime was not assessed in an 
objective manner by the activists. Conversely, it appeared throughout the research 
that the MB regime followed gender-discriminative policies during its executive 
and legislative period. However, it is also evident that the majority of respondents 
could not take an unbiased approach to El-Sisi, even though they have had some 
reservations on some issues, mainly on the implementation of legislation on 
gender equality. Furthermore, results also show that despite the new regulations of 
the El-Sisi rule that have allowed the government to monitor NGOs activities and 
to restrict freedom of association, the majority of activists preferred to uphold the 
regime’s hypothetical commitment to fight against sexual assault of women and 
its gender-equality policies included in the 2014 Constitution.  
 However, throughout the analysis, there were some contrarian voices, 
albeit very few. In this sense, it was also interesting to see that a minority of 
respondents approached the deposed Morsi regime more positively than the El-
Sisi rule in that there was still a room for NGOs to function independently from 
the regime needs and interests during Morsi’s presidency. This also allowed me to 
see that some secular feminists, albeit a minority, have not translated their 
ideological disharmony with the Islamic Muslim Brotherhood regime – who are 
being criticized of taking up women’s rights as long as either they are compatible 
with the Islam or inasmuch as they are serving the interests of ‘average’ Egyptian 
women – into the uncritical support of the military rule. 
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 In response to the research question, the conclusion was therefore reached 
that the majority of activist’s antipathy with the Muslim Brotherhood regime 
whose gender politics are substantially regarded as discriminatory by mainly 
relying on “established principles of Islam and Islamic ethic” (Ikhwanweb 2013) 
contributed to secular activists decision to support the military regime and 
applaud its effort on gender equality without being critical of neither of the 
patriarchal language which has been reproduced by El-Sisi nor repressive 
regulations threatening independent feminist organizations most of the time. 
 To conclude, the majority of activists’ strict ideological differentiation 
from the MB regime along with their support for the new regulations on the 
protection of women’s rights in the 2014 Constitution have made them support 
military rule with some reservations. Departing from this, it could be argued that 
four years after the crackdown of Mubarak regime, secular feminists have faced 
the reemergence of the patriarchal bargain. They are offered to abandon their 
independent organizational structures at the exchange of protection of previously 
gained legal rights and advances that have been made during El-Sisi’s presidency. 
The new deal offers state’s protection in return for obedience. However, we still 
need time to see how feminist women respond this in the long term. 
 This thesis thus presents a work-in-progress. While this study sought to 
find out why and how Egyptian secular feminist women’s coping mechanisms and 
strategies with the state during the political leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the presidential period of El-Sisi — between June 2014 and June 2015 —  are 
divergent from each other, further research is still necessary given that it was not 
likely to foresee the long-term effects of the current occurrence of the patriarchal 
bargain to Egyptian secular feminism in this thesis. The hope is therefore that this 
study can inspire further studies on the situation of the patriarchal bargain 
between Egyptian women and the state in the future.  
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8  Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: List of Interviews 
Dalia — born in 1989. A master’s student in Cairo, Egypt; and a non-affiliated 
feminist activist. 
Hafah — born in 1985. A member of Imprint Movement (Basma), a full-time em-
ployee at Basma. 
Amal — born in 1983. A member of Nazra for Feminist Studies, a full-time em-
ployee at Nazra. 
Nancy — born in 1986. A member of The Women and Memory Form (the WMF), 
a part-time employee at the WMF. 
Asra — born in 1989. A master’s student in Uppsala, Sweden; and a non-
affiliated feminist.  
Marian — born in 1987.  A member of New Women Foundation, a member of 
Basma (voluntary  base); a high school teacher. 
Sarah — born in 1983. A freelance journalist; and a non-affiliated feminist activ-
ist.  
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Appendix 2: Interview Questions 
 
1. Personal Background 
 a) When and where were you born? 
 
 b) Where did you grow up?  
 
 c) How do you define yourself and the way you make feminist activism? 
  
 d) When did you become involved in the feminist struggle? And what are 
the reasons behind that?  
 
 e) How would you describe your/your organization’s major aims?  
 
 f) How do you define the role that your organization play? 
 
2. Historical Overview  
 a) How would you portray the Nasser period? 
  
 b) How do you feel about the preservation of Personal Status Law of the 
1920s and 1930s during his presidency?  
 
 c) How would you characterize Sadat's presidential term?  
 
 d) What do you generally think about the rise of political Islam? What are 
the reasons behind this phenomenon? Which presidential period did corre-
spond to this? 
 
 e) How would you characterize Mubarak's period when it comes to wom-
en’s rights issues? 
 
 f) What do you think about the role of the state on feminist activity in 
Egypt in general? 
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3. The Brotherhood’s Women’s Empowerment Policies 
 a) Could you please briefly share your thoughts about the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s policy towards women’s rights issues?  
  
 b) How do you view women’s empowerment policies of the Freedom and 
Justice Party? 
  
 c) To what extent is it important for you to address the poverty and under-
development level of Egyptian women? 
 
 d) What is the difference between the agenda of Egyptian secular feminists 
and women’s rights policies of the Muslim Brotherhood? 
 
4. The Leadership’s Attitudes Towards International Agreements on 
Women’s Rights 
 a) To what extent are international law and various UN human rights 
conventions important for you?  
 
b) What is the most significant international agreement on the protection 
of women’s rights for you? 
 
 c) How do you see the Brotherhood’s policies towards international 
agreements? To what extent were they were adhering to these conventions 
and declarations?  
 
 d) How do you view the El-Sisi regime’s policies towards international 
agreements? To what  extent are they adhering to conventions and 
declarations? 
 
5. Sexual Violence against Women 
 a) What are the differences/similarities between the Mubarak era and post-
Mubarak Egypt when it comes to the extent and the nature of systematic 
violence against women? 
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b) What can you say about the security force’s involvement in sexual 
crimes? 
 
 c) Do you think that the Muslim Brotherhood had have willingness to 
combat violence against women? 
 
 d) Do you think that the El-Sisi rule have clear agenda to address the 
sexual violence against women? 
 
6. Constitutions, Legal Reforms and Religion 
 a) What do you think about articles on women’s rights included in the 
Egyptian Constitution of 2012? 
 
 b) How do you see religious provisions included in the Egyptian 
Constitution of 2012? 
 
 c) Where would you place yourself if I ask you to put yourself in a 
religious orientation scale? 
 
 d) Do you think that the status of women in Islam undermine women’s 
rights in the countries where the majority of people are Muslim? 
 
 e) How do you regard the Egyptian Constitution of 2014? 
  
 f) To what extent does the 2014 Constitution have progressive provisions 
than the 2012 Constitution? 
 
g) What do you think about the implementation of new provisions on 
women’s rights included in the Egyptian Constitution of 2012? 
 
h) Before ending the interview, would you like to add something? Are 
there any questions left unanswered? 
